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ABSTRACT

This paper explores the role played by U.S. maritime unions in
influencing the formation of American shipping policy.

The thesis of

the paper is that maritime unions have exerted great influence on legislators, through lobbying efforts to foster special-interest legislation which benefits union members at the expense of the taxpayer.
The research is based on standard works on shipping and maritime
labor relations, Hearings of the House and Senate Merchant Marine Committees, and newspaper and magazine articles which trace the progress
of various pieces of maritime legislation.

Only the activities of the

seagoing unions are discussed, and the paper does not deal with similar
activities by longshoremen's unions and other labor organizations indirectly associated with the maritime industry.

Where research is

based on newspaper accounts, conclusions are drawn from several independent sources wherever possible.
The overall conclusion of the paper is that labor unions, while
small in size compared to other industrial unions, have great power
over Congress through lobbying and large campaign contributions.

Further

conclusions are that this power has sometimes been exerted in ways which
do not accord with the public interest and is, to some extent, based on
illegal lobbying practices.

The negative effects of this on the economy

and on the future of the merchant marine are discussed, and present trends
are examined for their possible future impact.
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CHAPTER I

u.s. SHIPPING POLICY UNTIL 1970

American Seagoing Supremacy
The American merchant marine once led the world.

Although

Britain ruled the seas from a military standpoint until WWI, the 19th
Century ushered in an era of American supremacy in merchant shipping,
as Yankee ingenuity combined shipbuilding skills inherited from the
British with the design superiority of the French.
While the French and British fought it out in a series of exhausting wars which decimated their naval and merchant fleets, American
merchant tonnage rose from 400,000 tons in 1791 to over 800,000 tons by
1806. 1 This is not surprising; the u.S. had all the ingredients necessary to make it a major maritime power.
close to the water;

It possessed plentiful timber,

a long coastline indented with numerous good harbors;

and a relatively primitive system of interior communications which made
commerce heavily dependent on water transport.
It is difficult for Americans today, when the sea plays a relatively insignificant role in our national life, to imagine the hold ships
had on the popular imagination before the turn of the century.

The names

of famous builders and captains were as familiar to the public then as are
those of film stars and sports

heroes;~od~y.

largest movable structures created by man.

Ships were (and still are) the

Their creation and operation

called forth the maximum in ingenuity, skill and bravery, like the space
program of the 1960s.

The nation rose to the challenge by creating a

series of ships - culminating in the clipperships - which commanded the

1Marvin, W.L. , The American Merchant Marine
(New York, Harper & Co. , 1902) p. 131
1

2

world's wonder and respect.

They carried our flag to every corner of

the world, and made vast fortunes for the men who could manage them
successfully.

There was not one American millionaire before the advent

of the railroad empires whose fortune was not based on shipping.
This points up an obvious but sometimes overlooked fact.
have to make money.

That is their only real purpose.

Ships

Whether we consi-

der profits to the owners or furtherance of the nation's trade, the bottom line is making money.
emerged:

In recent years a relatively new concept has

that a strong merchant marine is necessary for our national

security.

The tension between these two ideas lies at the root of all

the controversy which surrounds u.S. shipping policy.
The War of 1812
American naval strength lagged well behind that of its merchant marine in the early l800s and, during the War of 1812, the British navy
took a devastating toll of u.S. merchant tonnage.

The restoration of

British merchant navy supremacy was, in fact, one of the major goals of
the British in that war.

The u.S. merchant marine recovered slowly but steadily from 1815
until 1840, and then entered a period of great prosperity which lasted
until around 1858.

After the American Revolution, the Congress had estab-

lished a system of protective tariffs and tonnage taxes designed to encourage the growth of shipping.

Following the War of 1812, many of these

barriers were lowered in exchange for various free trade agreements with
major shipping nations.

This free trade situation lasted until the 1840s,

when a technological revolution overtook the world shipping industry: steam
navigation became commercially practical on open ocean routes.

The estab-

lishment of a transatlantic route by the Cunard Steamship Co. impelled
Congress to meet the threat by extending a system of mail subsidies to
U.S. shipping companies.
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This was a significant move.

It marked the first time Americans had

responded to foreign technological superiority - not by designing something
bigger and better - but by propping up the less efficient ships with subsidies from tax revenues, and it set the pattern for what was to come.
The Challenge of Steam

The reasons behind this move are not hard to find.

The Industrial

Revolution had occurred earlier in Britain than in the U.S., which was
still preoccupied with absorbing its vast interior.

Britain and Germany

were the world leaders in iron and steel construction technology during
the Victorian era,

while the U.S. singlemindedly continued its practice

of wooden shipbuilding.

The introduction of subsidy removed the incen-

tive for Americans to replace their beautiful but obsolescent ships with
the spark-spewing iron monsters being produced on the Continent.

Indeed,

financial pundits of the day declared that steamships had reached the limit
of their commercial development in dominating the transatlantic runs.

The

lucrative trade to the Orient, the grain trade to Australia, the gold-rush
packet trade to California; all were out of reach to coast-hugging paddlewheelers which needed regular and frequent coaling stations.

Steamships

could not survive in the Roaring Forties which lay between the Atlantic
and the rest of the world.

They started to run for cover in conditions

which had the clippers setting royals and skys'ls, and smoking downwind
at 20 knots and more.
What the pundits did not forsee was the development of the screw
propeller and, in 1869, the opening of the Suez Canal, making the Orient
accessible to steamers.

At one stroke, these developments left the Ame-

rican merchant marine in an untenable position, and the situation was
worsened by the disruptions caused by the American Civil War.

There had

been laws against transferring ships from foreign to U.S. registry ever
since 1789.

During the Civil War, many U.S. shipowners had their ships
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transferred to foreign registry to escape blockades and privateers,
and because their insurance rates were less under a neutral flag.

After

the war, in 1866, a vengeful Congress shortsightedly ruled that these
vessels could not be returned to

u.s.

registry, depriving the

u.s.

of

one third of its merchant tonnage. 2
Protectionism

By 1880, the

u.s.

was in the position - now all too familiar - of

having an obsolete fleet which was too small to serve its national trade
needs.

Domestic traffic was still reserved for the

u.s.

flag, but mer-

chants began to form the habit of shipping their overseas goods on foreign
bottoms.

Laws passed by Congress requiring that

built in the

u.s.

and shipbuilders.

u.s.

flag vessels must be

began to drive a wedge between the interests of shipowners
The shipbuilders were either entrenched in wooden ship-

building or floundering in the developmental stages of iron and steel shipbuilding, producing inferior ships at higher prices than their British
counterparts, who had half a century of R&D behind them.

The shipowners

on the other hand, needed new, modern ships and could not afford to pay
higher prices for their ships and still remain competitive.
Free trade versus protectionism was a central controversy in the
politics of the Gay Nineties.

Democrats and shipowners were for free trade

and the abolition of any legal restrictions on the shipping industries.
They felt they could go it alone, without debilitating subsidies, if they
were allowed to buy the cheaper and better British ships.

Republicans

and shipbuilders, on the other hand, with heavy capital investments and
tradition-dominated industries at stake, stood out for protectionism, tariff
barriers, and maintenance of the subsidies and government controls.

2Zeiss, Paul M. ,
(Princeton, N.J.;

American Shipping Policy
Princeton University Press,

1938)

p , 15

By the
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turn of the century, mounting troubles in Europe fueled U.S. isolationism and the protectionists carried the day.

This marked the shipping industry's entry into pressure-group
politics on a large scale.

The warring camps battled their way through

several administrations until the Republicans were split and routed by
President Wilson in 1912.

During this period the shipowners themselves had split into two
groups.

Those who could not swallow the pill of subsidy and consequent

government interference in their operations confined themselves to the
domestic trade, which eventually became the most important part of the
U.S. merchant marine.

The rest swallowed the pill as a temporary measure

and gradually became addicted to it.
The Seamen's Unions

With the appearance of President Wilson on the scene, new actors
came onstage:

the International Seaman's Union (ISU) and the Sailor's

Union of the Pacific (SUP).

Prior to Wilson, maritime labor organizations

had had a sticky time of it.

They had found a champion in the person of

Senator LaFollette of the 62d Congress, but his bill to improve working
conditions and laws for seamen was smothered by a hostile Republican administration.

Wilson, a Senator in the next Congress, reintroduced the

bill and it passed the US Senate in 1913, only to be vetoed by President
Taft.

When Wilson became President, the Nelson Act - even more sweeping

in its reforms - found quick acceptance and was signed into law in 1915.
This act embodied most of the objectives the seamen's unions had been
fighting for for years, including payment of advances on wages, improved
scales of provisions, better living quarters, and a two-watch system.
also provided that at least 65% of the deck crew must be Able Seamen.

It
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This last provision outraged shipowners.

An Able Seaman, by

law, was a man who had at least three years sea experience and had passed
a Dept. of Commerce examination.
belonged to the unions.

Most of these men were old salts who

Shipowners.could not now indulge in the common

practice of firing a man whose union connections became known, and replacing him with a green hand.

In the words of a Pacific Mail Company

representative this was tantamount to " . . . handing over control of the
company to the Seaman's Union of the Pacific."3 and the company forthwith
sold its steamers and ceased to operate in the Pacific.

Similar pro-

nouncements of doom and imminent collapse carne from all sectors of the
shipping world, but before their validity could be tested the world was
plunged into WWI and the picture changed dramatically.
The Great War

During the first phase of the war, both the German and British
vessels which had been carrying the bulk of U.S. goods abroad suffered
heavy losses.

Ultimately the British navy was able to prevent German

ships from sailing from U.S. ports at all.

The U.S. was still neutral

at this time, and was ready and willing to sell its industrial output to
the combatants, but it lacked the ships to transport these goods.
the Ship

Registry Act of 1914,4

Under

President Wilson was allowed to acquire

foreign vessels, some manned by foreign crews, and sail them under the
U.S. flag in order to move the huge stockpiles which were building up in
American warehouses.

As sentiment gradually hardened in favor of the

Allies and the entry of the U.s. into the war became likely, it was seen
that these measures were not enough, and that the weak U.S. merchant marine was not going to be able to meet the challenge of full scale war.
The shipping Board Act of 1916 (passed on June 15, 1917) provided $750 million

3Zeiss, American Shipping Policy , p. 73
4Ibid., p. 83
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for shipbuilding and gave President Wilson sweeping powers to provide a
viable merchant marine as soon as possible.

As the scale of events in-

creased, funding was stepped up to a phenomenal (for 1917) $2.9 billion twice the value of the total merchant fleet of the entire

pre~war

world.

The shipbuilding program was undertaken in haste and repented at
leisure.

Rejecting the notion of building the ships in government

ship~

yards, the government dealt instead with private concerns; many of them
formed expressly to take advantage of the lucrative government contracts.
Building costs, which had been around $60 a ton in 1914, had risen to $200
and more a ton by 1917.

Lump-sum and cost-plus contracts were offered to

companies which had never built a ship before, and which took advantage
of every chance to pad payrolls, buy excess material, and use shoddy workmanship while charging premium prices.
In addition to being extremely costly, the building program was
slow.

Of 18 million tons projected to be built, less than one sixth had

been delivered by Armistice.

The U.S. government was reduced to borrowing

ships from its hard-pressed allies and using impounded German vessels to
get its own troops to Europe.

By the end of the war, a third of the total

shipping ordered had not even been started, but the contracts had been
signed and hundreds of ships were launched in the years following the war,
for which the government had no use.
With the war over, the government's biggest job was finding a way
to get rid of this expensive surplus, and massive ship sales were held,
with American shipowners acquiring new vessels at a fraction of their construction cost.

There were serious proposals advanced, mainly by the

Democrats, that the Government retain a substantial portion of the ships
and go into the shipping business itself.

The strategic importance of

merchant shipping had been hammered home by the events of the war, and
noone wanted to be caught out again.

But this experiment in socialism

never came to pass - even its supporters acknowledged that the government
was ill fitted to run a shipping business at a profit, and the Republicans
produced numerous studies to show that subsidy would be cheaper than the
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costs of a federal operation.
Postwar Prosperity

The period immediately after WWI was one of great prosperity for
shipping companies.

The shattered nations of Europe needed vast amounts

of goods from the U.S. and most of their merchant tonnage had been sunk.
Shipowners, able to acquire large numbers of ready-built ships at bargain
basement prices, exploited the situation to the fullest.

As the world

economy moved in an inevitable swing from postwar boom to depression bust,
however, U.S. shipping interests again found themselves in hot water.

By

1927, European competition had grown strong and the flow of world trade
was slowing.

U.S. shipowners found their large fleets an embarrassment,

and many ships sailed half-empty.

Forgetting the lesson of 1900, the

government moved to preserve the merchant marine by reviving and expanding
the mail subsidies,and introducing new ones, in the Merchant Marine Act of 1920.
Unsurprisingly, this second excursion into subsidy had the same
result as the first.

Far from strengthening the shipping industry, it

made it dependent on tax-funded handouts.

As the depression deepened after

1929, shipowners saw little incentive to replace obsolete ships because there
was little cargo to carry.

Once again, America's competitive position

worsened while the cost of subsidy climbed steadily.

Themail subsidy

system was extremely complicated, depending on variables such as ship
speed, routes covered, age of ships etc.

The U.S. Shipping Board was

not well equipped to administer this system equitably, and many said it
did not understand the system itself.

As a result there were many abuses,

much graft, and accusations of bribery and undue influence were made
frequently.

Finally President Roosevelt undertook to clean out the Augean

Stables and proposed a New Deal for shipping.
Marine Act of 1936.

The result was the Merchant
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The Merchant Marine Act of 1936

This act was hailed as a "scientific" shipping subsidy program,
with built-in checks and balances.

It encouraged shipbuilding through

a Construction Differential Subsidy, whereby the government paid the
difference between domestic and foreign shipbuilding costs, thus making
it possible for shipowners in foreign trade to remain competitive.

Pro-

visions were also made for inexpensive financing guarantees, a tax-free
ship replacement fund, and war risk insurance.

Since this paper deals

with the role of maritime labor in forming national shipping policy, it
will deal only with the subsidy which directly affects seamen:
Operating Differential Subisdy.

the

Before going on to examine the effects

of this subsidy, some background on maritime unions will be

~e1pfu1

to

the reader.
Maritime Unions

During the laissez-faire capitalism following WWI, organized
labor in the maritime trades had fared poorly.

Americans were suspicious

of "syndicalism" and viewed union members as radicals or worse.

Seamen's

wages fell sharply during the mail subsidy years, even as shipowners' profits mounted.

In 1921 the only real seamen's union of any size - the ISU -

struck the West Coast in a desperate attempt to improve wages and working
conditions.

It was locked out by the shipowners, who found an easy source

of non-union labor in the masses of demobilized veterans, and who found a
sympathetic government ready to wink at the AB requirements and lend troops
and assistance in dealing with strikers.

Maritime labor was virtually

destroyed by this blow, and never really recovered until the mid-30s, when
labor gained more respectability during the Depression.
By 1936, however, unions had become a political force to reckon
with, and their potential for delivering votes was being recognized by
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the new breed of politicians, including Roosevelt himself.
mid-30s, maritime labor split into two warring camps,

During the

m~rroring

the split

between the Communist-dominated Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIa)
and the Socialist-oriented American Federation of Labor (AFL).

The lSU

was gradually infiltrated by communists and aligned itself with the CIa.
Ideological differences between these communists and the old-time "wobblies"
finally led to the communists splitting off again to form the National
Maritime Union (NMU) under the leadership of Joseph Curran.
its traditional stronghold on the East and Gulf coasts.

This union had

Since most of the

subsidized companies were headquartered there, it eventually acquired most
of them as its "territory".
On the West Coast, the old SUP, under the wobbly-influenced leadership of Harry Lundeberg, saw the growing power of the NMU as a threat.
Aligning themselves with the AFL they became, in 1938, the Seaman's International Union, and came to dominate the cabotage (domestic) trade.
Thus the split between the shipowners; subsidized foreign-going and un subsidized domestic, was duplicated by a split in the unions.

Each union

claimed "its " segment of the industry and began to eye the territory
of the other.
When the NMU split off from the old ISU, the remnants of that
organization were absorbed into the SIU, enabling the latter to gain a
toehold on the Gulf Coast.

Since then, each union has repeatedly tried

to take over "territory" belonging to the other - battles which have often
resulted in paralyzing strikes, leav.ing shipowners helpless, since they
could make no concession which would resolve the issue.

On political

issues, however, the rivals seldom come in conflict since they both have
contracts with subsidized and unsubsidized companies nowadays, and have
a common interest in maintaining subsidies and benefits.
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The Rationale of ODS

In 1935 most of this was yet to come, and union demands were
straightforward:

better pay and working conditions, safer ships, better

food and shorter working hours.

Roosevelt's Congress was inclined to

acceed to these bread and butter issues and,

al~hough

unions had not yet

achieved the sophistication of having paid lobbyists in Washington, their
wishes were listened to with attention.

Prior to 1936, the Mail Subsidy

had been given directly to shipowners.

There was no onus on the owner to

pass this windfall along to his employees in the form of higher wages,
and few did so.

Now Congress proposed to give this subsidy directly to

the seamen, through Operating Differential Subsidy (ODS).
ODS was similar to CDS in concept.

It attempted to allow for

higher wages for U.S. workers while keeping the shipowner competitive
with foreigners.

The owner's actual wage expense was compared with an

international standard (adjusted for the trade he was engaged in) established by the Secretary of Commerce, and owners were paid the difference.
Thus, short of falsifying his records, there was no way for the shipowner to keep any of this money; it all went to the seamen and officers
who worked on his ships.

Unlike CDS, however, where the government had

discretionary powers to examine and reject the contract bids of shipyards,
ODS did not incorporate safeguards allowing the government to scrutinize or
approve labor-management wage negotiations.
ODS thus accomplished two things.

It gave maritime unions a

permanent political stake in formulating shipping policy, and it created
an open-ended wage/price spiral.

Shipowners now had little incentive to

resist union demands for higher wages;
increase, not the shipowner.

the taxpayer would be paying the

Since ODS was given only to ships in the

foreign trade which plied routes deemed "essential" to the interests of
the U.S., this situation would soon have led to a big gap between the wages
on foreign-going and domestic-trade ships.
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Domestic operators, therefore, came under the gun to match
the higher subsidized wages.

Having no subsidy to fall back on, they

raised their rates, passing the extra cost along to shippers and, ultimately, the American public.

In subsequent chapters we will be dealing

mainly with the direct costs of ODS subsidy for foreign-trade ships, but
the reader should be aware that the true cost of ODS is many times
greater than the amount of ODS appropriation each year, because of its
effect on wages in the cabotage trade.
The ODS Partnership

Another effect of ODS has been that, on most issues, labor and
management speak together with one voice and, as we shall see, join hands
and finances when lobbying, to an extent unprecedented in American industry.

Most tensions between labor and management revolve around the question

of wages.

In the maritime industry, these tensions are mitigated by the

buffering effect of subsidy.

It is significant that since 1936, unlike

most other industries, the majority of maritime strikes have resulted from
jurisdictional battles between unions, and not from wage issues.
Since both management and labor have a strong interest in maintaining or raising the level of subsidy, their lobbying efforts are not
split as is the case in most other industries, and they exert a correspondingly greater influence.

Congressmen hear noone who is against sub-

sidy, except the taxpayer, and his voice has only recently been heard.
Shipowners are also more subservient to their unions than are
their counterparts ashore, because the unions can control their workers
to a greater extent than in most industries.
a hiring hall, on a complex seniority system.

Seamen are hired through
Shipping companies submit

their needs for seamen, engineers and officers to the union, and the union
decides who will get the job.

The union is thus perceived by the worker
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as the source of employment.

Because of the hiring hall rotation, sea-

men usually do not return to the same ship or even the same company after
corning back from vacation; in fact unions discourage the practice.

Thus

workers never build up a loyalty to a particular ship or employer.

The

loyalty is all devoted to the source of employment:

the union.

World War I I
The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 hardly got a chance to test its
"scientific" subsidies before the world was once again at war.
followed the by now familiar pattern:

Shipping

initial undercapacity as neutral

America tried to ship its gigantic output to Europe with little help from
the beleagered ships of the Allies; then a massive shipbuilding program
to catch up.
This time, however, American industry was more prepared for the
onslaught and ships began sliding off the ways even before America's entry
into the war.

Assembly-line techniques which had made the U.S. a leading

industrial nation by the 40s were combined with the new science of continuous arc welding to turn out a seemingly inexhaustable stream of ships.
The mood of the times allowed women to work in industrial jobs, as personified by "Rosie the Riveter" of poster and cartoon fame and, in spite
of the manpower drains created by the draft, the ships kept corning.

Ameri-

ca's ship production astonished a world already used to prodigies from the
giant in the West.

In 1937, American shipyards had been launching only

about 7% of the world's tonnage.

In the period 1943-44, she launched over

80% of the world's new tonnage, or about 12 million tons a year!5

The U.S.

may rightly be said to have won the war in its shipyards alone.
At the end of WW II, the U.S. possessed the largest merchant fleet
5Gorter, Wytze United States Shipping Policy
(New York, Harper & Bros, 1956) pp. 32 & 38
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the world had ever known, totalling some 35.4 million gross tons; nearly
half of the entire world's fleet, and was again faced with the problem
of what to do with it.

The usual postwar shipping boom enabled shipping

companies to buy up much of it, and by 1955 the U.S. privately owned fleet
totalled some 25.4 million tons.

Under the Merchant Ship Sales Act of

1946, about 1,100 of these wartime vessels were sold foreign, and the
rest were laid up by the government as a "reserve" fleet in case another
national emergency came along. 6
The Long Decline
This time the letdown from the postwar boom was less dramatic,
as first the Korean conflict, then the Cold War, then the Vietnam crisis
introduced mini-peaks into the gradual decline.

These abberations aside,

however, the decline was steady and the U.S. share of America's oceanborne
foreign trade fell from 57.6% in 1947 to only about 5% in 1970, at which
figure it has hovered ever since. 7 These figures are remarkable when it
is considered that the volume of America's foreign trade did not decline
during this period, as had been the case after WW I.
substantially.

In fact, it increased

Just during the period 1956-1970, total US foreign trade

increased from 260 million long tons to 473 million long tons.

During the

same period, the amount carried by U.S. flag carriers declined from 54
million to 25 million long tons. 8 Much of this decline can be attributed
to the fact that, with a large amount of cheap shipping on hand during
the early fifties, U.S. shippers felt little incentive to modernize or
replace their fleets before the statutory twenty year period had elapsed
and the ships became ineligible for further ODS.

Since most of the ships

were built at about the same time, they became superannuated at about the
6Figures from: Gorter,

United States Shipping Policy,

7Jantscher, Gerald, Bread Upon the Waters
(Wash. D.C. , The Brookings Institution, 1975)
8 I b i d., p , 26

p. 28

p. 6
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same time as well, so the industry was faced with block obsolescence.
Shipowners once again became dependent on subsidy and operated obsolete
ships which could not hold their own against growing foreign competition.
Foreign shipping companies were more aggressive, and they developed
designs which were not only cheaper to build, but cheaper to run because
they cut down on manning requirements.

In the U.S. the maritime unions

fought a bitter holding action against any attempt to cut down on manning
levels and, with the taxpayer picking up the difference anyway, U.S. shipowners did not have much incentive to insist.

Thus the cost of operating

foreign ships held level or even declined in some cases, while U.S. operating

costs rose.

Since the "basement" (the amount shipowners pay in wages

out of their own pockets) was linked to the operating costs of foreign
ships, the percentage of wages paid by ODS grew larger each year to keep
up with rising U.S. wages.

Even though the actual number of seamen was

declining as the fleet shrank, the annual cost to the taxpayer grew steadily.
TABLE 1
Operating Differential Subsidy, 1960-70
Year

Subsidized
Ships

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

313
300
314
316
318
311
309
311
307
293
247

Total ODS
Expenditure
$152,756,000
150,143,000
181,919,000
220,677,000
203,037,000
213,334,000
186,628,000
175,632,000
200,130,000
194,703,000
205,732,000

ODS per Ship
$ 488,000
500,000
579,000
698,000
638,000
686,000
604,000
565,000
651,000
665,000
833,000

Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Annual Report of the Secretary
of Commerce (Washington, D.C. , U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1964-1971)
pagination varies.
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By 1971 the ODS cost per ship had risen to $1,301,000; more than
doubling in the space of ten years.

The reader should keep in mind, how-

ever, that these figures are somewhat offset by the fact that, during this
period, U.S. ships increased in size and carrying capacity per unit, so
that the increase of ODS as related to carrying capacity is not quite so
dramatic.

It is' still significant, however - the increase in deadweight

tonnage of the U.S. fleet from 1960 to 1970 was only 900,000 tons DWT9.
These cost increases were, in large part, related to wage increases
but , until 1970, kept pace with the general rise in wage levels in the
nation.

In fact, from 1936 until 1970 seamen's wages were generally below

the national average for workers in production manufacturing, and the
high ODS costs simply represented the differences between the economies
of the U.S. and her foreign competitors.
TABLE 2
Relative Earnings of U.S. Able Bodied Seamen and
Production Workers in Manufacturing, 1940-68
Monthly Base Wages
Year
1940
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1968

Able Bodied
Seamen
$

73
145
226
314
369
393
444

%

Production Workers
in Manufacturing

Differential

114
164
240
310
381
434
498

56.1
13.1
6.2
-1.3
3.3
10.4
12.2

$

Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, The Handbook of Merchant Shipping
Statistics Through 1958 and Seafaring Wage Rates for 1964, 1967 &
1968. Both published for the U.S. Maritime Administration, (Wash.
Information on
D.C. , Govt. Printing Office) Pagination varies.
production workers from Statistical Abstracts of the United States
1949 Table 238, p. 215 and Business Statistics 1969 , p. 81, b~th
published by the G.P.O. for the U.S. Office of Business EconomlCS.
9Kilgour, John G. , The U.S. Merchant Marine
Publishers, 1975) Table 1.1, p. 8

(New York, Praeger

CHAPTER II
SHIPPING SUBSIDIES SINCE 1970

The Merchant Marine Act of 1970
The decade of the 1970s began with a comprehensive overhaul of
U.S. merchant marine policy, to correct some of the problems inherent in
the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.

The U.S. fleet had, by 1970, dwindled

to the 6th or 7th largest in the world, and much of it was obsolete, uneconomical, and destined soon for the scrapyard.

The impetus for change

was provided by President Nixon's need to make good his campaign promise
for " .•. remedial measures far more constructive and far more comprehensive than those of (my) predecessor."
Maritime interests combined to exert pressure on the administration to make this promise more than empty words and, on 23 Oct. 1969, the
President's maritime program was outlined to Congress by Secretary of Commerce
Maurice Stans.

Representative Ed Garmatz (D-Md) introduced the bill to

the House Merchant Marine Committee as HR 15424 in December and hearings
were held in February 1970.
The program was carefully tailored to find the widest possible
acceptance among the pressure groups representing maritime labor and
management and did not, therefore, deal effectively with the root causes
of the problems besetting the U.S. merchant marine.

Among the major

goals of the act were:

1.

A commitment to build 300 ships over the next ten years.

2.

ODS and CDS were to be extended to tankers and other bulk
carriers , instead of just to liners as had been the case in
the 1936 act.
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3.

The amount of CDS was supposed to drop, by incremental
stages, from 50% in 1970 to 35% by 1976 as foreign costs
rose and the productivity and efficiency of U.S. shipyards
increased.

4.

ODS for subsistance was discontinued.

5.

The basis of wage subsidy was changed so that subsidizable
pay raises were linked to an index of wage/price guidelines
in other industries.

Any raises granted by shipowners which

went beyond these guidelines would come out of their own
pockets.

The extension of ODS to bulk carriers was a major victory for
the unions, and represented a marked departure from the 1936 act, which
had imposed a number of restrictions on ODS, linking it to trade routes,
the number of sailings, the age of the vessel etc.
were absent in the 1970 act.
omission

These restrictions

In the words of Gerald Jantscher; "This

reflects the atmosphere of good feeling in which the maritime

legislation of 1970 was passed.

In 1936, Congress determined that there

should be no repetition of the scandals which had marred the mail subsidy
program, and so it carefully specified in the 1936 act how large the subsidies should be.

The situation was different in 1970.

Congressional

opinion favored a large expansion of aid to the maritime industries."l
Another bit of legislative carelessness was the fact that the
wage-raise guidelines which were supposed to control the costs of U.S.
maritime labor applied only to the base wage and not to fringe benefits
such as pension and training funds, vacation pay, overtime, and so forth.
As we shall see shortly, this omission was to have grave effects on the
cost to taxpayers of subsidizing ODS
1Jantscher, Bread Upon the Waters,

p. 25
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The Growth of ODS
Since 1970, the amount of ODS paid has increased steadily, while
the number of ships subsidized, and the overall carrying capacity, have
decreased.

Since an ever-larger percentage of ODS is directly attributable

to wages and benefits, most of this additional tax money goes right into
the pockets of union members working on subsidized ships.
TABLE 3
ODS SUBSIDY PAYMENTS THROUGH 1977

Year

Average 75%2
For Wages

ODS Paid

Total
Ships

Total
Billets

Cost per
Billet

1970

$205,731,711

$154,298,783

244

13,017

$11,854

1971

268,021,097

201,015,823

209

10,028

20,045

1972

235,666,821

176,750,115

201

9,528

18,550

1973

226,710,926

170,033,194

186

10,343

16,439

1974

257,919,080

193,439,310

177

8,617

22,488

1975

243,152,315

182,364,236

190

8,055

22,639

1976

386,036,020

289,527,015

188

9,193

31,494

1977

342,755,328

257,081,496

189

8,568

30,004

Source:

U.S. Maritime Administration, MARAD '76 (Washington, D.C.

Government Printing Office, April 1977)

and information supplied

directly by the MARAD Office of Maritime Manpower.
Thus the average ODS cost per ship rose from $843,162 in 1970 to
$1,813,626 in 1977;

an increase of over 100% in only seven years. During
The best estithe same period, the ODS cost per billet nearly tripled.
2The figure of 75% of ODS for wages is an average supplied by the
Office of Maritime Manpower. The figure stood at 60% at the beginning of the decade but has been climbing steadily and is now
over 90%.
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mate of today's subsidy is offered by the 1979 Maritime Authorization
Hearings.

The following is a question submitted in writing by Rep. Paul

McCloskey (R-Calif) and MARAn's answer:
McCloskey. How many seamen are supported by operating differential
subsidy funds in FY 1979? What percentage of the total ODS package is represented by seamen's wages? What is the average federal
cost per seaman on a subsidized vessel? What is the average federal cost per billet? Please provide a full explanation of the
costs derived.
MARAn. We estimate that in FY 1979 there will be 7,797 billets
aboard 194 subsidized cargo liners, providing employment to a
total of 16,374 seafarers. This is based on the most recent available information of the ratio of actively sailing seafarers to
actual billets (2.1 to 1). Total ODS payments in FY 1979 are budgeted at $300,540,000 of which 91.7% or $275,542,000 represents the
portion allocated to seafarer employment costs, including base wages, fringe benefits, overtime and so forth. This represents
$16,828 per seafarer, and $35,339 ber billet. ODS budget estimates are based on carefully made projections of u.S. and foreign
costs, and in the case of seafarer employment costs, on projections of the wage index system on subsidizable wage costs. 3
In the course of the same hearing, MARAn estimated that its own
expenses for administering the ODS program would be $3,632,000 for 141
employees. 4 If we accept that these expenses can be apportioned in the
same ratio as the ODS itself, with 91.7% attributable to wages, then the
wage administration will cost the taxpayer an additional $3,268,800 in 1979.
The Problems of Maritime Labor
One of the reasons for high labor costs on u.S. ships can be seen
in the figures shown above.

Each job is expected to support 2.1 people.

During WW II and shortly afterwards, large numbers of merchant mariners
were recruited to keep the shipping boom supplied with labor.

As the

3U•S• Congress, House, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Merchant
Marine, Serial No. 95-37, 95th Congress, Second Session. H.R.
10729, p. 330
4 Ibid.

p. 40
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number of ships gradually declined, union leaders were faced with a
blem.

pro~

Either they had to decrease their membership, by accepting layoffs

and limiting membership rolls, or they had to make the shrinking number of
jobs somehow support their members.

A union's strength is in numbers, and

the maritime unions were already far smaller than their shoreside counterparts in manufacturing industries.

Union leaders decided to try the "Loaves

and Fishes" miracle of making the jobs go farther.

In large part they

have succeeded, by raising base wages and fringe benefits to the point
that union members can make a respectable wage while working only about
half a year, thus leaving the other half open for someone else.
Most maritime union members were in their twenties when they
entered the booming job market in the early 1950s.
are between forty-five and fifty years old.

Now most of these men

The number of jobs available

has shrunk faster than the natural attrition through death, retirement, etc.
The result is that most unions have not been eager to welcome younger men
into their ranks to compete with old-timers for jobs.

Where younger men

have been recruited, stringent seniority rules have discouraged many of
them from staying.

This is now beginning to backfire, as union leaders

realize that the bulk of their membership is going to reach retirement at
about the same time.

Not only will this put a staggering strain on union

pension funds, but it is likely to create a serious shortage of trained
seamen.
Seamen's Wages & Fringe Benefits
Since the beginning of the 1970s, seamen's wages (see 'Figure 1) have
been above the national average for U.S. white males over twenty five years
of age, but these wage increases have, in fact kept pace with the wage/price
guidelines established by Congress.

Since U.S. seamen are only earning

about one half of the time (2.1 seamen per billet) one might wonder how
they make ends meet.

The answer, of course, lies in the fringe benefits,

which are not subject to the restrictions of the wage guidelines.

Before
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looking at the fringe benefit picture, let us see how base wages have developed during the 1970s.

FIGURE 1
BASE WAGE MONTHLY EARNINGS OF U.S. ABLE BODIED SEAMEN
COMPARED WITH U.S. WHITE MALES OVER TWENTYFIVE YEARS OF AGE

$/month
1000
900
800
700
600
500

Source: U.S. Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of 1977
(Washington D.C. Govt. Printing Office, 1977)
However, base wages represent only about 35% of thetotal-ObS
benefits paid to seamen.

The rest is in fringe benefits, such as vacation

and pension funds which, by themselves, total more than base wages.
Since the Merchant Marine Act of 1970, these benefits have risen sharply
since getting more benefits was one way a union boss could bring back
something to "show the boys" without infringing the wage index and getting the shipowner in trouble with the government.

As a result, the per-

centage of fringe benefits to the total wage packet has risen from less
than 15% in 1960 to over 60% by the middle 1970s.
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TABLE 4 5
BREAKDOWN OF WAGES ON A CLASS A-I
BREAKBULK VESSEL
Category

Arnt. per month

Base Wages

$ 45,630

Non-Watch

3,656

Vacation

24,637

Pension

21,793

Medical/Welfare

4,431

Feinburg

3,939

Training/Lundeberg

2,012

Overtime

24,549

Add'l training

266

Special Acct

225

Employee Commission

905

Total

$132,042

If we take just one union as an example, we can see how the
fringe benefits (exclusive of base wage) have increased in the period
1965-75:

During this period the Marine Engineer's Beneficial Association

(MEBA), Pacific District increased the pension plan contribution per man
per day from $8.67 to $39.31.
214% just since 1970.

The pension contribution has increased

The welfare contribution for this union increased

from $1.40 per man per day in 1965 to $3.56 per man per day in 1970, and
to $11.56 in 19761

In 1970 the sum total of all fringe benefit contribu-

tions for MEBA (Pacific) was $9.13 plus 34.5% of the base wage, per man
per day.
By 1976 it had risen to $21.94 plus 55.3% of the base wage. 6

5U.S. Congress, House, Merchant Marine Oversight Hearings,
94th C9ng~~5s. 2d Session, Serial No. 94-32, p. 79
6Figures supplied by MARAn Office of Maritime Manpower
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One should not imagine from these figures that individual seamen
are getting rich.

In 1976 (The base year for Table 4) the average seaman

earned only about $8,000 in base wages, and worked only 180 days.

He re-

ceived an additional 60 days paid vacation, and went unpaid for 125 days.
The problem is not that individual seamen are overpaid, but rather that
the wage rates have to be inflated to support an excessive number of them
on a few jobs.
There is more interesting information to be drawn from the preceding table.

The vacation, pension, medical and training funds are

paid monthly to the union, not to the seaman.

The seaman collects his

vacation money from the union when he signs off, sometimes after many
months at sea.

During this period, the money has been in the union's

account drawing interest.

The seaman gets the vacation money, eventually,

but the union gets the interest.

In the example shown, a total of $57,078

gets paid directly to the union from that ship in that month, of which
$24,637 is vacation money.

If this can be taken as a representative

figure, and since there were 190 ships operating under subsidy in 1976,
\

then the unions received vacation payments totalling some $4.7 million
each month.

If we further assume that the money stays in the union

account for an average of three months before being claimed and earns a
modest 6%, it would generate a standing balance of about $14 million,
which would put $842,585 in interest into the union's coffers each year.
Tax Supported Union Schools
Virtually all maritime union contracts have a sum to be contributed by the employer, per man per day, for "training".

This money goes

to the union to operate the union's training school and, of course, the
taxpayer pays for most of it.

Referring again to Table 4, the reference

to "Training/Lundeberg" indicates the amount that ship contributed to the
Harry Lundeberg School at Piny Point, Maryland.

The school is operated

by the Seaman's International Union for upgrading and training new members.
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The MEBA also operates a large training school in Baltimore, and there
are several smaller union-operated training programs.

All of these

schools are supported by contributions from shipping companies.

Students

attending them do not pay tuition; in fact, at the MEBA school they receive
a salary of $200 per month.

Graduates of the schools are obligated to

remain as members of the union for a stated period after graduation.

Both

subsidized and non-subsidized companies contribute, but, of course, only
the contributions of the subsidized companies are a direct cost to the
taxpayer.
Union members speculate privately that the schools provide high
paying sinecures to union officials and that not all of the money given
by the companies goes into training.

The House Merchant Marine Committee

is currently looking into allegations that some training money is diverted
to political purposes.

It is not easy, however, to get information on

the extent of support received by these schools from the government and
private industry, and requests by the author to school administrators
were ignored.

During the course of hearings on the 1979 Maritime Appro-

priations, the following exchange took place between Rep. McCloskey and
Jesse M. Calhoon, President of the MEBA, which captures some of the flavor
of such inquiries:
McCloskey. Mr. Calhoon, can you describe the benefit package that
you have negotiated for your members with the subsidized liners?
What does it include in addition to payroll benefits? Besides the
paycheck, what additional benefits do you negotiate for your union?
Calhoon.

I don't think we have the time.

McCloskey. Well are you able to furnish this committee with a copy
of your last negotiated contract with anyone of the subsidized
liner companies?
Calhoon. I will be glad to.
by thecormnittee).

(This information was not received

McCloskey. Will you furnish the committee with a list of the value
of those benefits on an annual basis, that you have negotiated?
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Calhoon.

No.

McCloskey. I am trying to get the precise figure out of the
$400 million subsidy that foes for salaries and other benefits
for members of your union. The figure that we have from the Mari~
time Administration dated 13 April 1976, was that the payments to
the MEBA Training Fund made by subsidized companies for 1976 totaled $2.89 million.
Would you have any objection to an amendment
to the Maritime Authorization Bill that would limit the subsidy to
the wages that were paid to your members, as opposed to the training
benefits and the political contributions?
Calhoon. I don't know what we would support and what we would
oppose. We would have to submit it to our membership. (paraphrased
by the author for brevity)7
Because of the difficulty of obtaining copies of union contracts
with shipping companies, it was not possible to prepare a complete summary
of training fund contributions, however the Office of Maritime Manpower
(MARAD) was able to supply some representative figures;

Companies

contracting with the Masters, Mates and Pilots union (MMP) pay $6.00 per
man per day plus $1000 per ship per year for "training".

Shipowners con-

tracting with MEBA (Pacific District) pay $6.73 per man per day, plus
$1000 per ship per year.

Associated Marine Officers (AMO) $3.00 plus

$1000 per ship per year. National Maritime Union, $1.15 per man per day.
Seaman's International Union, $3.62 per man per day.
The Public Health Service
The role of the Public Health Service in supplying medical care
to seamen at the taxpayer's expense was not discussed in the previous
section, although American Merchant Seamen have enjoyed free medical care
since 1844.

In 1798, President Adams signed into law a bill creating a

system of "Marine Hospitals" to provide for the medical care of merchant
seamen.

Until 1844, the cost of this was deducted from seamen's wages.
7U.S. Congress, House, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Merchant
Marine, Serial No. 95-37, 95th Congress, Second Session.
H. R. 10729

27
In 1844 the Congress passed a law levying tonnage on all ships
entering U.S. harbors, and this tax was used to fund the hospitals.

In

1906, the funding was taken over by direct appropriation, and six years
later the marine hospitals became the Public Health Service.

Since that

time, free PHS medical care has also been extended to PHS employees, lepers,
Coast Guardsmen and their families, civilian seamen on U.S. government
ships, and personnel of the National Marine Fisheries Service and the
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration.

While it is not

unusual for the government to provide free medical care for its own employees, the provision of this care to private citizens working in private
industry is without parallel anywhere else in the nation.
The system of free medical care for seamen was begun as a form of
federal subsidy to shipowners, to relieve them of the medical costs incurred
in a dangerous industry.

It was intended to encourage shipbuilding and

trade, and to correct the notorious fact that shipowners cared little about
sick or injured seamen, were not inclined to pay their medical expenses,
and didn't pay the seamen enough to enable them to pay their own expenses.
Mr. Justice Story, U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Maine,
enunciated the feeling of the time in Harden v. Fordon, 1823, by ruling
that shipowners should be responsible for a seaman's "maintenance and
cure" if he was injured on the job.

In a famous bit of dicta, he said:

"It appears to me so consonant with humanity, with sound policy,
and with national interests, that it commends itself to my mind
quite as much by its intrinsic equity as by the sanction of its
general authority. Seamen are, by the pecularity of their lives,
liable to sudden sickness from change of climate, exposure to
perils, and exhausting labor.
They are generally poor and friendless, and acquire habits of
gross indulgence, carelessness and improvidence. If some provision be not made for them at the expense of the ship, they must
often, in foreign ports, suffer the accumulated evils of disease
and poverty, and sometimes perish from want of suitable nourishment . . . "
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• . • "Beyond this is the great public policy of preserving this
important class of citizens for the commercial service and maritime defense of the nation."8
With that unique blend of humanitarianism and commercial instinct
which characterised the Victorians, Society found that, in principle,
shipowners should pay, but, in practice, did not require them to do so.
Shipowners did what shipowners still do when faced with costs from which
the government has not shielded them:

they swore they would go out of

business if forced to pay for medical care.

So the taxpayer, who is not

allowed to go out of business, picked up the tab.
The PHS Hospital System
Whether seamen, with relatively high wages and powerful unions,
may still be said to be "poor and friendless" may be open to question,
but there is no question that they get good medical care.
reached a maximum of 30 in 1943, due to the war.

PHS hospitals

Since reaching that

peak, the number has steadily declined for lack of business until, in
1965, only 12 general hospitals, 3 special hospitals (including the
leperosarium) and a number of outpatient clinics remained.
In that year, James F. Kelley,

Deputy Assistant Secretary for

Administration, HEW, addressed the House Merchant Marine Committee on a
proposed plan to close seven of the general hospitals, and expand the five
remaining ones, located at Baltimore, New Orleans, San Francisco, Seattle
and Staten Island, N.Y.

Seamen needing treatment at locations too remote

to visit one of these would be eligible for treatment at VA hospitals or,
failing that, at private hospitals at government expense.

The reduction

was prompted, according to HEW, by underutilization of the sys.t.em and by
rising costs.

The average occupancy was running at about 75%, which is

very low by hospital standards, and the closures would save millions.

8Healy & Sharpe, Admiralty Cases and Materials , (St. Paul, Minn.
West Publishing Co. , 1974) p. 311
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The reduction was vigorously opposed by maritime interests, especially the unions, and roundly condemned by the House Merchant Committee
but a reduction to eight hospitals was eventually carried out.
In December of 1970, rumors about hospital closures were again
circulating.

This time HEW was thinking about closing down all the Marine

Hospitals and shifting the medical care of merchant seamen to VA hospitals.
The House Merchant Marine

Subcommittee, chaired by Rep. Ed Garmatz, met in

emergency session to take testimony from labor and shipping interests and
gather information to sink the proposal.

The PHS was at this time opera-

ting eight general hospitals and thirty outpatient clinics, and the hospitals were running at about 75% capacity.
Elliot Richardson, HEW Secretary, testified to the committee that
HEW's closure recommendation was based on the small size and inefficiency
of the PHS hospitals, the large sums required to renovate them, the low
occupancy, and the availability of facilities at VA hospitals at lower
cost to the taxpayer (in 1970, $48 per day for inpatients, vs $58 at
PHS hospitals).
The reduction was opposed strongly by Committee members and lobbyists for the maritime interests.

To date the closures have not come

about, although the subject was reviewed in 1974 and again in 1976.

Each

time, the House, backed by unions and industry groups, put up a strong
battle to keep separate facilities for seamen.

The cost of this medical

care to the taxpayer is shown in Table 5, for the years 1972-76.
Ironically, many seamen do not bother to take advantage of this
service since they are provided with health insurance by their employers.
Since this health insurance is part of the benefit package, it is also
paid for, in large part, by the taxpayer.

Tax revenues are thus funding

two separate and redundant health systems for seamen, but any attempt to
cut back on either brings angry reactions from maritime union spokesmen.

TABLE 5
PHS HOSPITAL COSTS
1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

Per Diem Cost
meals

$ 71. 56
3.68

$ 83.36
4.44

$ 92.12
5.43

$ 103.57
5.94

$ 119.17
6.69

Total per patient
Average daily nr.
of seamen treated

$ 75.24

$ 87.80

$ 97.55

$ 109.51

$ 125.86

Inpatients

738

70S

641

631

613

Total cost per day
for seamen l/P

$ 55,527

$ 61,899

$ 61,554

$ 70,195

$ 77,152

Total cost/year

$ 20,267,355

$ 22,593;135

$ 22,467,210

$ 25,621,175

$ 28,160,480

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -I
Outpatients
Average cost
per visit
Nr. seamen
Total cost, O/p
Total cost

$ 13.12

$ 14.58

$ 16.20

$ 18.00

$ 20.00

261,023

251,134

244,787

250,695

258,722

$ 3,424,521

$ 3,661,534

$ 3,965,549

$ 4,512,510

$ 5,174,440

$ 23,691,876

$ 26,254,669

$ 26,432,759

$ 30,133,685

- - - - - - - --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - --

-- --

- - - -- -

--

$ 33,334,920

Source: U.S. Dept. of Health, Education & Welfare, Bureau of Medical Service Annual
Statistical Survey, FY 1976 (Washington, D.C. U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1976)
Note: If costs follow the average trends indicated above, overall costs for 1979
will reach about $44,500,00.
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CHAPTER III
UNION LOBBYING
The Sources of Political Clout

The subsidies and other benefits we have been examining are
not an inevitable outgrowth of economic forces.

They are the result

of policies deliberately chosen by elected representatives, supposedly
for the ultimate benefit of the American people.

Increasingly, it is

being acknowledged that these policies are not working; are not reaching
the goal of a viable merchant marine which serves the trade needs of the
nation.

Yet there has been little real change in U.S. shipping policy

since 1936, except in the increasing amounts of subsidy money spent each
year.

There is no single reason for this failure on the part of the
government to come to grips with the situation.

It is often pointed

out that the U.S. really does not have a shipping policy, and that intergovernmental conflicts prevent the formation of a unified policy.

But

to say this is to describe a symptom rather than to diagnose the illness.
Unquestionably there are major controversial issues of national security,
international relations, balance of payments and foreign trade all of which
must be brought into balance, but it can be said with assurance that a
principal reason for the lack of an effective shipping policy is the
extent to which legislators are influenced by special interest groups in
the maritime industries.

We will examine here only one aspect of this:

lobbying by maritime unions; but it is well to remember that shipping
companies, oil companies, shipyards, shippers' groups and shipyard unions
all play their roles.
The present structure and condition of the major maritime unions
is, in a sense, a product of the subsidy structure which supports the
whole industry.

Without this structure, it is doubtful that maritime
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unions could exist in their present form.

It is only natural, therefore,

that union leaders will do everything in their power to foster and protect the system which is essential to their survival.
would be to

betray their membership.

To do otherwise

Union politics are essentially

pragmatic; there is no place for lofty considerations of "what is best
for the nation".

The union leader who does not deal with bread and butter

issues in a manner satisfactory to his members is not a leader for long.
One should keep in mind, therefore, in considering the material in this
and following chapters, that the onus lies not with the unions to limit
their activities to what is "right" for the country.

It lies with the

legislators for permitting themselves to be unduly influenced.
Union lobbying is not new, but its impact is increasing.

During

the past 100 years, the social and economic character of the blue-collar
worker has changed more than that of any other segment of the population.
In the late 1800s, sweatshops were common;

now studies are made of how

workingmen can fill the leisure time provided by paid vacations.

Labor

leaders used to be workers themselves, proud of the callouses on their
hands.

Now they tend to the portly, live in wealthy suburbs and rub

shoulders with business executives and politicians.

Maritime labor has

changed its attitudes as well; reflecting these changes in its character.
Originally, the maritime worker viewed the government as little different
from the employer, and not to be trusted.

Here are some partial excerpts

from Maritime, a union publication of the 1940s:
" • . . it is now the government itself, instead of individual
shipowners, which stands facing maritime labor, l therefore any
economic action automatically becomes a political action."
. . . "Today all demands are political. Even a small job action
for washrooms on Liberty ships is filled with political significance because it is directed at a government board . . . "

LTh i s was written during WW II, when seamen worked directly for
the wartime Shipping Board.
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"The present Capitalist management and its stooges naturally will
fight against such measures as workers' control. Even if it were
won, the struggle could still be lost if political measures were
not taken in time to consolidate the victory."
" The United States Congress is made up of Republicans and Democrats. Both of these political parties are organizations of the
employing class, representing conflicting tendencies within that
class. The eleven million organized American workers have not one
single representative in Congress. The unions have their "Washington representatives". They cool their heels in the ante-chambers
of Congress trying to find some Republican or Democrat who will
introduce a bill for them."
"Only a political party of the working class can seriously address
the demands of American labor to the Capitalist government. The
government's maritime program will sooner or later (try to) eliminate the independent existence of the seamen's unions." 2
The unions' long-hoped-for Socialist Labor Party never became a
serious political contender, but the problems anticipated in the article
were solved in ways the writer could never have forseen.

Contrast his

view of scornful capitalist Congressmen trampling on hapless workers with
the obsequious reception accorded Paul Hall, President of the AFL-CIO
Maritime Trades Dept. by Senator Russell Long (D-La), Chairman of the
Senate Merchant Marine SubCommittee, during the hearings leading up to
the Merchant Marine Act of 1970 :
Long: " May I say in New Orleans you have one of the best locals
I know of and one of the best local leaders, Lindsey Williams, and
I think the fine work you have done rubbed off on him and vice versa.
Hall~"Thank you very much.

II

Long: "Thank your people for doing a fine job down there."
One does not get the impression that Mr. Hall spends too much time
cooling his heels in the Senate antechamber.

By "job", Senator Long is

2Lang, Frederick J., Maritime, (New York,
1943) p. 167-168

Pioneer Publishers,

II

34
not referring to splicing rope and painting bulkheads, as he makes clear
to Earl W. Clark, Co-Director of the Labor-Management Maritime Committee
during the same hearing: 3
Long: " Generally speaking, it has been my good fortune to have
the support of labor every time I ran for office. In some cases
I had the unanimous support of all labor groups. That doesn't
mean I get the votes of all their membership, but usually I received
a very large majority. I hope I merited that by the record I made."
At the time he said this, Senator Long was chairman of the Senate
Subcommittee which was framing the subsidy provisions of the 1970 Merchant
Marine Act.

An examination of Senator Long's voting record reveals that

the boys down in Louisiana should have been very pleased.

The way the

system works was enunciated even more clearly back around the turn of the
century by Republican Senator Boies Penrose, who remarked candidly to an
audience of businessmen:
"I believe in a fair division of labor. You send us to Congress.
We pass laws under which you make money. Out of your profits. you
further contribute to our campaign funds to send us back again to
pass more laws to enable you to make more money."4
One suspects the good Senator may have had more wine at lunch than
was good for him, but make him a Democrat and the audience a group of
maritime labor leaders, and you have precisely the atmosphere under which
much of this nation's shipping subsidy legislation has been passed.
Lobbying
Lobbying is defined in the American Heritage Dictionary as "seeking

3U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Senate Merchant
Marine Subcomittee • S-3287, 91st Congress, 2d Session. Serial
No. 91-67. p. 568
~U.S. Congress. Senate, Energy Transportation Security Act of 1977

95th Congress. 2d Session, S-61, Ser. No. 95-43.

p. 109
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to influence legislators in favor of some special interest".
nothing illegal or sinister about the practice.
government is guaranteed by the First Amendment.

There is

The right to address one's
Nor is there anything

illegal or sinister about campaigning on behalf of a favored politician,
attempting to influence others to vote for him, or contributing one's
money to his campaign.

All of these practices are as old as Democracy,

and their unrestricted practice is one of our surest guarantees against
tyranny.

The very diversity of public opinion ensures that from the pro-

cess will emerge something close to the collective will of the people.
However, certain institutions, because of the unusual power they
exercise over large numbers of people, have constraints upon them which
limit these constitutional rights.

Among such instutions are banks, cor-

porations, and tax-exempt institutions such as labor unions.

These con-

straints, insofar as they apply to unions, are given below, from Title 18,
Section 610, of the U.S. Code.
"It is unlawful for . . . any labor organization to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election at which
Presidential or Vice Presidential Electors or a Senator or Representative in or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to Congress are
to be voted for, or in connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any of
the foregoing offices, or for any candidate, political committee,
or other person to accept or receive any contribution prohibited
by this section."
"As used in this section, the phrase 'contribution or expenditure'
shall include any direct or indirect payment, distribution, loan,
advance, deposit, or gift of money, or any service, or anything
of value."
The law goes on to authorize, however; " . . • the establishment,
administration, and solicitation of contributions to a separate
segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes by a corporation or labor organization, Provided : that it shall be unlawful
for such a fund to make a contribution or expenditure by utilizing money or anything of value secured by physical force, job
discrimination, financial reprisals, or threat of (these); or by
dues, fees or other monies required as a condition of membership
in a labor organization or as a condition of employment, or by
monies obtained in any commercial transaction."
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To summarize; unions may ask their members for strictly voluntary
contributions, which can be used for political purposes.

But they must

not use union dues or contribute services which are paid for by such dues.
In this chapter we will examine the scope of maritime union financial
contributions and lobbying, and identify the major maritime labor lobbying
organizations and the issues they have dealt with in the last ten years.
In the following chapter, we will look at how closely maritime unions have
abided by Title 18.

Before proceeding, a rundown of the major actors on

the maritime stage in Washington will help the reader keep things straight.
Maritime Lobbying Organizations
AFL-CIO ; George Meany, President. The AFL-CIO lobbys on matters
relating to congressional labor policy generally, and, through the
Committee On Political Education (COPE), it organizes get-out-thevote drives, campaigns on behalf of favored candidates, and contributes money to their campaigns.
AFL-CIO MARITIME COMMITTEE,

Talmadge Simpkins, Exec. Dir.

This

lobbying organization represents about half of all maritime unions.
It looks out for the interests of the NMU and its affiliated organizations:

MEBA Plan 1 (for engineers), and MMP (for officers). It

represents one of the two major "warring campsfl which divide maritime labor, but which unite when it comes to subsidy issues.

The

NMU has traditionally had more to do with the subsidized liner companies and can be expected to speak out on issues affecting them.
AFL-CIO MARITIME TRADES DEPT.

Paul Hall, President. The counterpart

to the Maritime Committee, the Maritime Trades Dept. represents the
other major faction in maritime labor;
subsidieries including MEBA Plan 2.

the SIU with its numerous

The SIU traditionally had a

bigger stake in the domestic shipping scene, and therefore greater
interest in legislation affecting the Jones Act and the other cabo-
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tage laws.

These differences between the SIU and the NMU have

blurred in recent years as each has successfully "raided" segments
of the other's territory, and it is safe to say that both have a
strong interest in maintaining high levels of subsidy of all types.
TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE,

Herbert Brand, President

The Transpor-

tation Institute is, purportedly, a "Non-profit educational research
organization".

In fact it is a labor-oriented lobbying organization

which frequently testifies before House hearings 1 and takes strong
partisan positions.

As we shall see in Chapter IV, it is funded

by shipping companies as part of the SIU contract agreement, and
therefore receives a substantial part of its support from taxfunded subsidies.
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT MARITIME COMMITTEE,
Simpkins, Co-Directors

Earl Clark & Talmadge

The LMMC is a counterpart to the Trans-

portation Institute, and represents the NMU and the companies it
contracts with.
NATIONAL MARITIME COUNCIL,

Lewis Paine Jr. , Exec Sect. This is

the "Chamber of Commerce" of the maritime industries.

It represents

the collective interests of all shipowners, and is supported by all
segments of the industry.

It works together with the maritime unions

in coordinating strategy for major lobbying efforts.

A good part

of its support comes from subsidized companies, and therefore from
the taxpayer.

The

~~

specializes in grass-roots lobbying to

gain public support for increased subsidies and a stronger Merchant
Marine.
In 1978, a House Investigating Committee disclosed that the NMC
was receiving financial and logistic support from MARAn.

A full-time

MARAD official, Lewis Paine, had been acting as Executive Secretary for
the NMC, and approving its ad campaigns.

MARAn had also supplied some

forty employees to the NMC at a cost to taxpayers of about $200,000 a
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year, even though the agency had been previously advised by its own legal
counsel that this could lead to a "troublesome conflict of interest".

The

House Investigating Committee, headed by Rep. Benjamin S. Rosenthal, accused
MARAD of "plundering the U.S. Treasury" and criticized MARAD officials for
extensive use of travel funds for themselves and their wives to attend
numerous NMC "dinner dances" staged to help build support for U.S. shipping.
As a result of the investigation, the agency was ordered by Secretary of
Commerce Juanita Kreps to sever its ties with the NMC. 5

In addition to the various lobbying organizations mentioned above,
there is an approximately equal number of lobbying organizations which
represent different groups of shipowners.

With one or two exceptions,

such as the Federation of American Controlled Shipping (FACS) which represents U.S. owners of foreign flag vessels and the American Petroleum
Institute (API) , all of the shipowner's lobbys have as much interest in
maintaining subsidy levels as the unions do.

Usually they speak together

with the union lobbyists on most issues; a unique situation in American
labor/management relations.

Thus, members of the House Merchant Marine

Committee hear an overwhelming majority speak out in favor of a liberal
subsidy policy, and practically noone who opposes it.
The Maritime Administration
The Maritime Administration is not itself a lobbying or policymaking organization; its job is to carry out the policies made by Congress.
However it sometimes takes partisan positions.

As an agency of the ex-

ecutive branch, MARAn is often in the difficult position of having to
explain the failures of policies which it does not make.

Its incentive

to suggest improvements on its own is checked by the political ties
various presidents have formed with maritime labor.

Since 1970, many

presidential candidates have £ound it necessary to promise the unions
more ships, jobs and money.

MARAD can scarcely be expected to stand up

5Washington Post, 2 Oct '78, p. C-23; 21 July '78, p. 2;
'78, p. 7. New York Times, 22 July' 78, p. 28

26 July
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in hearings and make recommendations which run counter to such proposals.
MARAn is, moreover, officially mandated to "promote" the merchant marine.
Finally, like most regulatory agencies, it has formed close relationships
with the industry it regulates, and has come to see things their way.

Thus

it is not surprising that MARAn is a partisan, rather than a neutral witness at the policy-making sessions of Congress.
The Goals of Maritime Lobbying
Maritime lobbying organizations have confronted many issues during
the past ten years, but their major efforts have been devoted to the
following:
Making it inconvenient or impossible for U.S. companies to
own or operate foreign flag vessels, or else trying to force
them to put their foreign flag vessels under U.S. union contracts.
Increasing ship construction in the U.S.
Maintaining or increasing ODS levels, and extending subsidy
to an ever-wider spectrum of U.S. shipping.
Maintaining the PHS hospital system.
Promoting various kinds of cargo preference legislation.
Cargo Preference
It is in the field of cargo preference that the major efforts
(and funds) have been expended in recent years.

Cargo preference acts

require that some percentage of a certain class of cargo must be carried
by ships of the flag state.

An example is the law that a high percentage

of foreign assistance (AID) shipments must travel on U.S. ships.

Such

cargo preference legislation is a common way for countries to help their
merchant marine, and most major maritime nations have some form of it.
In the United States, there have been numerous attempts by maritime
lobbyists to extend cargo preference to new areas, and to expand the percentages required by existing cargo preference legislation.

For instance,
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the unions and shipping companies capitalized on the Argo Merchant disaster and subsequent spills by foreign ships to suggest that U.S. vessels
were safer and better run, and that therefore more oil should fie brought
to the U.S. on U.S. flag tankers.

Lengthy hearings were held, but it

was not easy to prove that the U.S. tanker fleet, with an average age of
17 years, was better than, for instance, the Liberian fleet, with an
average age of 5 years, and the safety record of the U.S. privately owned
fleet was no better than the international average.

In any case, the

expense and lead time to build new ships ruled this out as an immediate
solution to the oil spill problem, and the problem was handed to the
Coast Guard to solve through regulatory means.
All cargo preference schemes have three things in common:

(1) They

involve carrying more cargo on higher-cost U.S. vessels, so the costs of
shipping that item (and its consequent retail price) would go up.
(2)

Since the U.S. fleet is small and, at present, inadequate to carry

a much larger share of our foreign trade, such schemes would trigger
large shipbuilding programs.

Because U.S. construction costs are so

much higher, the government would end up paying out huge amounts of CDS.
(3)

These new ships would require ODS in order to be competitive, since

they would probably not be exclusively engaged in carrying preference
cargo but would also compete in foreign trade generally • . If this were
the case, they would impose a further heavy burden on the treasury.

The

result of these three factors would be increased taxes, higher prices and
inflation.
The Energy Transportation Security Act (ETSA)
Probably the most sustained and intensive lobbying effort by
maritime interests in recent years has been the series of Energy Transportation Security Acts, culminating in the act of 1977.

The legislative

history of these acts offers a perfect example of the influence maritime
labor organizations exert on legislators, and for the balance of this
chapter we will look at it in some detail.
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The orginal proposal was put forward by the labor-management
coalition in 1974.

It was a bill to mandate the carriage of 20% (in-

creasing eventually to 30%) of all
vessels.

u.s.

oil imports on American flag

At this time, U.S. ships were carrying about 4% of such cargos.

Since the U.S. fleet did not have anything like the capacity to carry this
amount of oil, enactment of the bill would have required extensive shipbuilding, something the AFL-CIO favored strongly.

Proponents of the bill

argued that it would provide a large amount of employment, both in the
building of the ships and in manning them; that it would help the balance
of payments problem, and that it would enhance the security of the
nation since the U.S. would not be so dependent on foreign flag vessels
for its vital oil supplies.

Those in support of the bill were mainly

shipbuilders and shipyard unions, maritime unions and U.S. flag shipping
companies.
Opponents of the bill included most of the oil companies (who
owned extensive foreign flag fleets) foreign shipping organizations which
were presently carrying much of the oil, and U.S. "public interest"
groups who felt the bill was inflationary or were concerned about the
rumors of high-pressure lobbying and payola which surrounded the progress
of the bill, as we shall see in a moment.

The bill's opponents claimed

it would cost the taxpayer up to $60 billion by 1980, through rises in
oil prices due to more expensive transportation, and because of increased
subsidies.

MARAD and the Comptroller General of the United States both

prepared estimates which showed a more modest, but nevertheless substantial cost to the public.
In response to this, the unions and shipping companies produced
figures showing that the measure would cost the taxpayer little or nothing,
in real terms.

Although some rises in the price of oil might be expected,

(they said), the corresponding benefits in increased employment and better
balance of payments would more than offset them.

On the whole, the various

factions with their sets of figures more or less cancelled eachother out,
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leaving the impartial observer with the impression that no one was telling the truth.
The pro-cargo-preference groups also stressed the national security aspects of the bill, claiming that passage was "vital" i f the
entire energy security of the nation was not to rest in the uncertain
hands of Greek and Norwegian shipowners.

This faction was somewhat dis-

heartened by the rather lukewarm support they got from the Department of
Defense on this point.

DOD did not, apparantly,feel that a fleet of

U.S. supertankers would be of much use in a national emergency, and
feared the program might cut into military shipbuilding appropriations.
DOD also pointed out that the security of the sources of imported oil
was much more questionable than the security of the means of transportation.
The 93d Congress held 15 days of hearings on HR 8193, the Energy
Transportation Security Act of 1974, over a six month period.

Most tes-

timony was concerned with attacking the figures presented by opposing
factions, and stressing the patriotic motives which underlay the view
being presented.

The House Merchant Marine Committee was chaired by
Rep. Ed. Garmatz (D-Md) until his retirement in 1973 6 when he was succeeded
by Rep. Frank Clark (D-Pa).
6In 1977, Garmatz was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury for recelvlng
illegal bribes from shipping companies, and soliciting further sums
in exchange for sponsoring legislation worth $24 million to the
firms in question. The charges were eventually dropped by tacit
consent of the Justice Dept. in Jan. '78 because, according to a
House Merchant Marine Committee source who does not wish to be
identified, "he was a poor old man, at the end of his career. " In
the course of the investigation, Garmatz commented impatiently;
"Who in hell did they expect me to get it from, the post office people?
The bankers? You get it from the people you work with, who you
helped some way or another. It's only natural."
The "it" he
was referring to were alleged illegal campaign contributions, not
the bribes, which he denied taking but which shipping company officials
admitted to giving. See: Washington Post, 2 Aug. '77, p. 1; 3
Aug. '77, p. 7; Wall Street Journal, 10 Jan. '78, p. 6
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The Merchant Marine Committee was predominately Democratic, and was

sympathetic to the bill, but it faced a hostile administration,

since Pre-

sident Ford inclined to the oil companies' point of view and felt the bill
was inflationary.

Over the objections of his administration, the bill

passed the House on 8 May, 1974 by a vote of 266 to 136, but was pocketvetoed by Ford on 30 Dec.

The merits of this bill and its successors are

not relevant to this paper, so we will pass on to the efforts by maritime
lobbyists, especially union lobbyists, to get it passed.
Laying the Groundwork for ETSA '74
The maritime unions had planned their strategy well in advance.

In

December of 1973, The Nation reported that President Nixon addressed 200
delegates of the SIU in Washington and, ".

. did everything short of

donning oilskins and crying 'thar she blows' to suggest his affinity with
the vasty deep.

In a rambling, gesture-filled speech, he made use of

nautical metaphores and gestures, grasping at an imaginary ship's wheel
and pantomiming a seasick sailor.

'It is,' he said, 'the Captain's job

to bring the ship into port, and I assure you that you don't need to
worry about my getting seasick or jumping ship!' ."7
The article went on to identify SIU President Paul Hall as one of
Nixon's few friends in the labor movement, and points out that the SIU
alone contributed $100,000 to Nixon's 1972 campaign.

This money was sup-

posed to be from the union's fund of "voluntary" contributions, in accordance with Title 18, but curiously (the article states) the SIU borrowed
exactly $100,000 that same day from the Chemical Bank of New York, later
repaying the debt with union funds.

The Nixon election committee delayed

reporting the contribution for three months, though legally required to do
so within 48 hours.

Nixon was to prove that he had a very strong stomach

indeed, and probably would not have gotten "seasick".

If he had not

been forced to resign, the Energy Transportation Security Act would be law.

7The Nation,

10 Dec. 1973,

p. 612
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The legislative branch also received its share of attention from

the unions.

According to the Washington Post , members of the House who

voted for the bill in 1974 had already received a total of $84,876 in
campaign contributions from maritime unions in 1972, while those voting
against the bill had been given only $12,000. 8
Now, with 1974 at hand, the pace of lobbying and contributing
picked up.

By 8 August, the MEBA Political Action Fund alone had reported

expenditures of $371,153

including a $25,000 loan to Sen. Mike Gravel

(D-Alaska) which he later admitted to soliciting.

Sen. Gravel, a key mem-

ber of the Senate committee which would be considering the Energy Transportation Security Act, stated reassuringly that there was "not a word
about the legislation; no quid-pro-quos at all."

He also assured the
Washington Post that "I fully intend to pay this loan back." 9 A few
weeks after his re-election in November, however, the MEBA reported that
it had "forgiven" and "canceled" the loan.

Sen. Gravel received additional

amounts of $6,000 from the MEBA and $15,500 from the SID, bringing his
total maritime contributions to $46,500 in 1974. 10
Altogether, maritime unions contributed $333,000 to Senators and
Representatives in 1974.

Of this money, 126 Representatives out of the

266 voting "for" the bill received money, while only 3 out of the 136
voting "against" got contributions.

Sen. Javits (R-NY) received $3,500

but returned it to the unions two days before he voted against the bill.
He declined to comment on whether the refund was to avoid any conflict of
interest.
The Big Winners
Among the high-scorers in the contributions game, apart from
Sen. Gravel, was Sen, Russell Long (D-La), Chairman of the Senate Merchant

8wa shington Post , 20 June 1974 , p. 1
10 Aug. 1976 , p. 3
9Ibid
2 Nov. 1974, p. 2
10 Ibid , 2 Sept. 1974 , p. 3
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Marine Subcommittee, who got $22,000 even though he had only token
opposition in the primary and was unopposed in the main election.

An-

other big winner was Rep. Frank Clark (D-Pa), Chairman of the House Merchant Marine Committee after Garmatz left, who got $17,600.

Sen. Daniel

Inouye (D-Hawaii) who succeeded Long as Chairman, received $10,000 as a
campaign contribution even though he was unopposed in the election.
major Senate recipients were Alan Cranston (D-Calif) $14,500;
Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) $13,000;

Other

Howard

and Warren Magnuson (D-Wash), Chairman of

the Senate Commerce Committee which is the parent of the Merchant Marine
Subcomittee, $12,900.

Earnest Hollings (D-SC) who was to chair the

hearings in 1977 got $7,200.

Rep. John Murphy, present Chairman of the

House Merchant Marine Committee, received $7,000. 11
This financial largesse did not go unnoticed by Capitol Hill
watchers, and it provoked widespread accusations that the Congress was
sabotaging the President's efforts to control inflation in order to help
special interest groups.

A New York Times editorial complained that:

"The bill oiled its way noiselessly through the House in May and
through the Senate last month. Large political campaign contributions from the Marine Engineers Benevolent (sic) Association
and other maritime unions to influential members of Congress undoubtedly helped smooth the way for this measure."
• . • "This kind of intimate relationship between campaign contributions and special interest legislation demonstrates the
compelling need for public financing of most political expenses.
Obdurate resistance in the House blocked that reform this year
except for presidential elections."12
In all, the SIU's Seafarer's Political Action Donation (SPAn)
and the MEBA's Political Action Fund reported combined expenditures of
nearly $800,000 between 1 Jan. and 24 Oct. of 1974.

The reader should

keep in mind that most of this money was funded at about 75% by federal
subsidy.

Apart from the contributions mentioned previously, some of the

$800,000 consisted of transfers to COPE and contributions to various
l l Wa s h i ng t on Post, 16 Sept. 1974 , p. 1

12 New York Times , 12 Oct. 1974 , p. 30
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Democratic Campaign Committees.

In addition to these expenditures,

maritime unions were able to offer other incentives to .legislators.

The

SIU owned a printing plant in Brooklyn which was available to print campaign literature for favored candidates.

Fat speaker's fees were paid for

guest appearances, such as $2,500 for one speech by Sen. Hollings.

Cour-

tesies were extended, such as the payment of a $339 liquor tab at a dinner
honoring House Merchant Marine Committee Chairman Leonor Sullivan (D_Mo).14
The Unions Flex Their Muscles
A good example of the "clout" wielded by maritime unions is offered
by the New England natural gas proposal, which cropped up during the period we have been discussing.

Early in 1974, the Boston Gas Co. had a chance

to secure a supply of liquified natural gas on behalf of six New England
utilities, from a plant in Alaska.

In view of the critical shortage that

winter, they asked the Federal Energy Administrator, William Simon, for
a waiver to the Jones Act so they could use a Norwegian tanker to transport
it, since there were - at that time - no U.S. flag LNG carriers in commission.

The Jones Act requires that any cargo carried from one port of the

U.S. to another be carried on a U.S. flag vessel.
John Knubel, Deputy Assistant Energy Administrator, reported that
he met with union representatives and that they were " dead set against
it.

They felt it would be a foot in the door jeopardizing their position

on cargo preference."lS

Humiliated, the government didn't even give

Boston Gas the courtesy of a formal rejection, and New England didn't
get its gas; (it was sold foreign).
Clearly, the unions felt they had the clout to win in 1974 and,
but for Nixon's Watergate problems, they would have.

With Ford in the

White House, however, it was a different ball game, and when he vetoed the
14wall Street Journal,
lSIbid,

17 Dec. 1974,

17 Dec. 1974 ,
p , 26

p , 26
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bill its supporters and their friends on Capitol

Hill decided not to

re-introduce it until a new and more simpatico president was at the helm.
The task now was to find that president and ensure that, when the bill was
re-introduced, it would meet with the same favorable reception in both
House and Senate that it had in 1974.
The Drive for ETSA-77
Supporters of the bill found their man in Jimmy Carter.

In May

1976 he announced that "if elected, I will seek a national cargo policy
which will assure our U.S. flag merchant marine a fair share of all types
of cargo.,,16

On the strength of this promise, Jesse Calhoon (MEBA Pre-

sident) and other maritime interests quickly put together a $200,000 warchest for his primary.
Common Cause, the "Citizen's Lobby" in Washington which keeps an
eye on such things, said in an editorial dated September 1977 that union
political funds added another $23,781 to this figure.

These contributions

were for the primary only, since the general elections were 100% tax funded.
All the maritime unions, and the AFL-CIO's COPE, staged massive get-outthe-vote drives to propel Carter to victory.
Once elected, however, Mr. Carter began to receive warnings from
his leading economic advisors, State and Defense Department officials, and
others, that a cargo preference bill of this scope was ill-advised, protectionist, and tailor-made for special interests.

Political cronies

warned him that his sponsorship of the bill would invite criticism.

Only

the Maritime Administration and the Labor Department joined the President
in supporting the bill, and both of those organizations were acknowledged
to be heavily

influenc~d

by labor and industry interests.

16Wa shington Post, 29 July 1977,

p. 2
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When Rep.John Murphy, the new Chairman of the House Merchant Marine
Committee, re-introduced the bill during the first session, it was with
the same proviso that U.S. ships would end up carrying 30% of all oil cargos.

Carter, acting on advice that this figure was unrealistically high

and impossible to implement, cast about for ways to keep the unions happy
without bankrupting the nation.

He asked Robert Strauss, a savvy politician

and former Democratic National Chairman, to look for alternatives.
Strauss canvassed union leaders and legislators and reported to
Mr. Carter in a memo that he (Carter) was viewed as "committed to a cargo
preference policy" and that such a policy would "politically . • . be very
hard to resist."17

In particular, Strauss reported Sen. Long as saying

that the concept of cargo preference was more important than the percentage
(since once the principle was established, the percentage could always be
increased) .

Long reportedly assured Strauss that "anything you fellows

can satisfy Jesse Calhoon with, I will take and support. ,,17
In the meantime, Stuart Eizenstadt,

Carter's top domestic policy

advisor, had sounded the President's Economic Policy Group and, noting
their objections, termed the cargo pr-ef er ence bill a "flawed concept",
but agreed that it was probably apolitical necessity to which there were
few alternatives.

Eizenstadt shared the view that maritime interests could

accept cutbacks in the percentage carried for the time being.
President Carter, caught between a rock and a hard place, and
realizing that any rejection of the bill by him would be seen as a broken
promise, penned at the bottom of Eizenstadt's memo, "OK - Strauss get
minimum."

In announcing the President's support of the bill several days

later, MARAD ignored the political considerations and cited reasons of
"national security".18
17Washington Post,

29 July 1977,

p. 2

18New York Times,

29 July 1977, Sect. IV, pp 1 & 3
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With Presidential approval assured, but with the percentage cut
from 30% to 4~%, increasing to 9~% in five years, maritime interests were
ready to go full speed ahead.

The National Maritime Council, partly

formed and funded by MARAn, launched a massive grass-roots advertising
campaign entitled "Don't Give Up the Ship".

The campaign, reportedly

costing over $1 million, featured full page ads in prestigious newspapers and was intended to generate large and influential volumes of
mail to Congressmen. 19
Another group, calling themselves the "U.S. Committee to Turn
the Tide" (supported by both shipping companies and maritime unions)
hired Carter's campaign advertising director, Gerald Rafshoon, to conduct a nationwide campaign for support for the bill.

Former Carter

pollster Pat Caddell was also hired to perform market testing on the
campaign's impact.

White House Press Secretary Jody Powell, responding

to Republican charges, insisted that this use of Carter-connected people
was coincidence and that, although Rafshoon had regular and frequent
access to the President, there was no connection between his work in
behalf of the bill and the President's support for it. 20
By September, the Committee to Turn the Tide, now calling itself the U.S. Maritime Committee, had spent about $750,000 and Rafshoon
was putting together a blitz of newspaper ads and TV commercials for
Washington stations and papers which would cost another $250,000.

This

campaign was aimed primarily at the Congressmen themselves, according to
Rafshoon's Vice President, Stephen Leshar. 21
More Campaign Contributions
Naturally, lobbying efforts had not been confined to advertising
19Washington Post,

21 July 1978,

20Ibid., 2 August 1977,

p. 1

21Ibid., 14 Sept. 1977,

p. 6

p. 2

50
and letter writing.

Maritime unions had paved the road to cargo pre-

ference with a thick layer of greenbacks.

The bill's sponsor in the

House, Rep. John Murphy, Chairman of the House Merchant Marine Committee,
had ample reason to support the union's point of view.
received $5,000

from maritime interests.

In 1972 he had

In 1974 he received $12,500.

In 1976 he received $16,500 plus the votes necessary to return him to
Congress.

Now, in June 1977, union officials and industry representatives

attended a cocktail party "fundraiser" at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington
D.C., raising an additional $30,000 - over one-third of it from maritime
interests.

This took place in a non-election year and was not needed to

payoff debts from the previous campaign; it was pure "gravy".

On 2

Aug. 1977, Chairman Murphy's Committee reported the bill by a vote of
31-5.

Murphy had received a total of $43,650 from maritime interests

since 1972, the vast majority of it union money.
Of the 31 Representatives voting for the bill in Committee, 24
had received contributions totalling $83,263 from maritime unions during
the 1976 campaign.

Of the five Representatives voting against it, three

received no contribution, and the remaining two got $500 each.

Maritime

unions had also given more than $55,000 to the 1974 campaigns of the
Representatives who voted for the bill in 1977.

22

Of course, the Senate had not been forgotten.

Twelve of the 18

Senators in the Senate Commerce Committee had received a total of $129,059
in their most recent campaigns, not to mention four who had formerly
been on the committee but were not re-elected, and got an additional
$85,550.

Apart from these committee members, contributions were spread

lavishly through the general membership of the House and Senate.

Over

the last three elections, maritime unions had contributed almost $2 million,
culminating in $969,000 during the 1976 campaign alone.

The unions stood

ready for, and confident of, victory.23
22Common Cause,

How Money Talks in Congress , (Wash. D,C. 1978)

23Washington Post, 18 Aug. 1977, p. 2 ; 2 Aug 1977, p. 18
New York Times , 18 Aug. 1977, p. 15
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Doubts About ETSA

But another campaign was being conducted:

one to defeat the Eill;

being led inside the House by Rep. Pete McCloskey (R-Calif), who served
as minority leader of the House Merchant Marine Committee and, in the Senate,. by Sen. Robert Griffin (R-Hich.) of the Senate Merchant Marine Subcommittee.

This countermove was essentially based on questions raised by

members of the administration itself, as to the inflationary effect of the
bill and its effectiveness in solving the nation's problems.

Further im-

petus for resistance to the bill was provided by the increasing publicity
being given to the maritime unions' rather heavy-handed attempts to organize Congress to their liking.
When President Carter had begun having second thoughts about the
bill, he asked Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal, head of the Economic
Policy Group, to prepare a summary of the group's reactions to the proposed legislation.

Among other things the memo, made public by Rep. Pete

McCloskey, points out that neither the State or Defense departments supported the contention that the bill would enhance national security.
"Defense believes," the memo states, "that the essential national
security problem is access to, not carriage of, oil; and does not support
HR 1037 on national security grounds.

State believes that, on balance,

oil cargo preference would not be beneficial to national security." 24
These doubts by senior administration officials struck at the
heart of the argument. The bill's supporters had been saying all along
that the extra costs (up to $180 million per year according to some
estimates) were justified by the increased national security the bill would
provide, and now here were State and Defense pooh-poohing the idea.

24New York Times,

29 July 1977,

Sect. IV , pp. 1 & 3
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Rep. McCloskey in the House, and Sen. Griffin in the Senate, made
heroic efforts to get representatives from these two departments to testify before their respective committees, only to be stonewalled in each
case by the committee chairmen, who did not wish any such thing.

In both

cases, the only administration witness to testify was Robert Blackwell,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Maritime Affairs (and head of MARAD)
who stoutly maintained that the bill was essential to "the national defense
and security of the United States."

The following exchanges give the

reader some idea of the atmosphere in which the hearings were conducted.
Some parts have been abridged or summarized, for brevity.
In the Senate
Sen. Griffin:
(asking for other administration witnesses to be
called) I hope, Mr. Chairman, that there will be time set aside
for these people, in addition to others who are opposed to this
legislation, to have an opportunity to appear and testify. I'm
sure you had that in mind.
Sen. Hollings:

No, I don't have that in mind.

Senator Griffin: (after a pause) I'm shocked, Mr. Chairman.
Sen. Hollings: You stay shocked
• I know it's quite a good
act for you to put on. (ommission) We should get the government
to move and rebuild our merchant marine. And my answer is no,
I won't invite any of them to testify. I wouldn't refuse them if
they asked, but I think it's unnecessary at this time because
their position is known by the Commander in Chief of the Defense,
namely the President. He asked you to testify for him, isn't that
right, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Blackwell:

That's right.

Senator Hollings:

Thank you Sir.

Sen. Griffin: Mr. Chairman, are you saying that you not only are
not going to invite other people from the administration who ought
to be given an opportunity to testify, but also that you are not
even going to allow others outside the administration who may have
views on this legislation to testify?
Sen. Hollings (Indicates that, unless Blackwell has any further
remarks, that is correct.)
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Sen. Griffin: Mr. Chairman, I wasn't going to comment about the
fact that Mr. Carter got elected on this issue, but there is some
truth to that. In fact I understand that over $100,000 from the
unions involved with this particular legislation was contributed
to President Carter's campaign.
I also think we ought to take note of the fact that these same
unions contributed over $990,000 to candidates running for the
Senate and House in the last election.
I find it rather amazing - and I hope that you would speak only
for yourself and not for the Chairman of the Committee as a whole that you would not allow anybody to come in and testify against
this bill.
Senator Hollings: (to Blackwell) Well, Mr. Secretary, I'm sorry
you have to put up with this nonsense.
Mr. Blackwell:

I'm used to it, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Hollings: You know, we invite witnesses to testify. He
can talk about his $100,000 from London to Mexico. What the heck?
Are we going to get on to any important issues? He's amazed and
he's shocked that I'm not doing a service, and I'm doing it in a
slipshod fashion.
What's made this area slipshod is his attempt to get further
hearings. I can tell you very frankly, that, right straight to
the point, that everyone's testified that ever wanted to testify
on this bill. We've got an abundance of testimony.25
In the House
Rep. McCloskey: (asking for permission to call Administration
witnesses) I am imploring the chairman. All we ask is a free and
open debate, and cross-examination. One more day of hearings with
these administration witnesses cannot hurt the chances of this
bill being passed. It can help to cure the concern, felt in many
areas of this country, that this committee is so closely identified with the maritime industry that we have lost our capacity
for independent judgement on the merits and benefits to the nation
rather than just to this industry. (he goes on to propose a motion
to call Blumenthal, Strauss, Asst. Sect. of State Julius Katz, and
Asst Sect. of Defense Paul Riley).

25U.S. Congress, Senate, Energy Transportation Security Act, S-61,
95th Congress, 1st Session, Serial No. 95-43, pp. 24-27
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Rep.Murphy:

(replies, in effect, that as majority leader, it is

up to him to subpena witnesses and he will not do so in this case
because he respects the "executive privilege" of the President.
He suggests instead that they let Blackwell take the stand. He
goes on to say that - in any case - no such motion could have been
passed because there was not a quorum present. Summarized for
brevity. )
Rep. McCloskey: Mr. Chairman, there is a quorum of Republicans
present. It is somewhat unusual for me, after seeing a quorum
of Democrats present for every piece of legislation we have reported out recently, to find that you are the only Democrat here today.
Rep. Murphy: It is not in the least unusual. (he goes on to say,
at some length, that all the others had things to do).
Rep. McCloskey: (after some further exchanges) I understand
that, but I want the record to show that there are four Republicans
present, and one of sixteen Democrats. The absence of these members denies us the right to even call for subpenas.
Rep. Murphy: If the gentleman is inferring that the Democrats are
not here for that purpose, I think he is doing none of us a service,
including himself.
Rep. McCloskey: Well, the gentlemen of this committee received a
letter advising them of the time and date of this hearing, and a
letter from me stating that we would make the motion at this time
for the issuance of the subpenas. 26
While Rep. McCloskey was battling inside the House, another battle
was being waged in the press, led by John Wertheimer, President of Common
Cause.

Common Cause had been working for some years to build the case that

maritime contributions were improperly influencing Congressional decisions.
Now, new financial disclosure laws were making available to them figures
which they immediately published in the daily newspapers, together with
analyses of the cause and effect relationships between voting and financial
contributions.
By the time the ETSA reached the floor of the House for final action
26U.S. Congress, House, Energy Transportation Security Act
HR 1037, 95th Congress, 1st Session, Serial No. 95~11, pp. 462-465
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on October 19, 1977, the glare of national publicity was producing some results.

For one thing the sobering financial estimates pro-

duced by the Comptroller General were translated by many legislators into
higher prices at the gas pumps of their home states; not a proposition
likely to endear them to their constituents.

For another thing, too close

a relationship with maritime unions was beginning to look like the political kiss of death.

As headlines blossomed daily with fresh disclosures

of political gift-giving by maritime interests, legislators began to have
second thoughts.

Labor lobbyists are very energetic, but they are not

terribly subtle.

The following comment was made by Rep. Railsback during

hearings on lobbying, in 1975:
Railsback: You have labor lobbyists. We walk over on the floor
and sometimes we have the labor people giving thumbs up or thumbs
down as we walk right into our chamber to vote. And most of them
are not even registered lobbyists, without a doubt. 27
ETSA Defeated
The result of all this was that the House handed maritime interests
a stinging setback, defeating the bill 257 to 165, even though it had passed
a much more liberal bill by a wide margin only a few years earlier.

Of the

215 Representatives who received union contributions in 1976, 85 voted against the bill, including three members of the House Merchant Marine Committee who had supported the bill in committee, but now turned against it.
According to the Wall Street Journal the unexpected reversal was due to:
"political heavyhandedness of the maritime industry and unions.
These unions gave huge political contributions to many lawmakers
in last year's elections and this time tried to call in those
chits, even privately threatening some members with political
retaliation. The intensity of this effort offended many lawmakers, producing yesterday's decisive defeat of the maritime
interests, these members said.,,28
27U.S. Congress, House, Lobbying.- Efforts to Influence Government
Actions , HR 15 & related bills, 94th Congress, 2dSession, p. 170
28Wa l l Street Journal, 20 Oct. 1977,

p. 5
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Rep. Murphy, way out on a political limb, had a different theory.
The defeat was caused, he said, by a conspiracy fostered by the Soviets
(who wanted more cargos for their merchant marine) and the big oil companies.
This unlikely coalition between socialist realism and silk-hatted capitalism was supposed to have "torpedoed" the bill's chances!29
Rep. Pete McCloskey, who led the successful floor fight, said in
a letter to Common Cause:
"Your publishing of the precise extent and nature of maritime
industry contributions over the years created a desire on the
part of many of my colleague~,particularly the new Members, to
finally declare their independence from the maritime lobby. I
believe this was the crucial factor in changing a 31-5 vote for
the bill in committee to a smashing 257-165 rejection on the Floor.,,30
This

politic~l

setback, and the huge expenditure of funds which

went in vain, has caused considerable headscratching among the political
strategists of maritime labor.

Maritime unions certainly will not aban-

don lobbying and political and financial muscle as survival tactics.

Poli-

tics is the only means by which the present system can be maintained.

But

the tactics of maritime union political chiefs can be expected to change
as a result of their setback.

Union political activity will, in all pro-

bability, become more subtle, more sophisticated, less partisan, and - probably - less indiscriminately lavish.

The power of the vote will be stressed

more than the power of the dollar in future, and, since individual maritime
unions are unimpressive numerically, we may see them burying their longstanding rivalries and differences in the interest of political solidarity.

The longstanding independent attitude of the maritime unions vis-a-vis

the AFL-CIO may also lessen, as maritime unions feel an increasing need
for the enormous power that organization can bring to bear,
29Wall Street Journal, 20 Oct 1977,

p. 5

30Common Cause, How Money Talks in Congress,

p. 10

CHAPTER IV
HOW UNIONS GENERATE LOBBYING POWER
Maritime Union Funding Sources
As we saw in previous chapters, maritime unions operate in an
increasingly fragile and artificial environment.

If the structure of

protective legislation and subsidy were removed, the whole house of cards
would come down.

Thus, unions have had to become political animals to

survive in the political jungle, where the most clout brings the biggest
rewards.

Since maritime unions are relatively small, one would not ex-

pect that they could swing much weight compared, say, with giants like
the UAW.

Yet maritime unions have become among the most formidable

labor lobbyists and, apart from the debacle of 1977, have been able to
achieve nearly all of their legislative goals.

Since they are not numer-

ically significant, we must look for other reasons for this success than
a simple ability to amass votes.
There are, in fact, several reasons for their success.

They

try very hard, and they have a lot of expertise in an area where most of
America is uninvolved, uninterested, and uninformed.
good at raising money.

Also, they are very

Just how good they are at money-raising has

caused some eyebrow-raising in Congress and in the press.

Until recently,

the liberal attitudes of pro-labor legislators kept anyone from looking
too closely at some of the methods maritime unions used to raise their
political money, and violations of Title 18 were winked at.
are different, and people are beginning to ask questions.

Now things
During the

1979 Maritime Authorization Hearings, Rep. McCloskey raised the issue
with Jesse Calhoon, President of the MEBA.
McCloskey: I want to read to you comparable figures for political
contributions in 1976 that came from other unions. I want you to
compare these with the amounts that came from the wages of your
union.
The AFL-CIO paid an average of 11¢ per member for political
contributions.
The American Federation of Teachers paid $1.37 per person.
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The International Ladies Garment Workers Unions paid $1.28

Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers, 48¢ per person
Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, 79¢
Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen, 32¢
United Transportation Union, $2.52
American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, 20¢
The Seaferer's International Union of North America, $29.06 per
person.
The National Marine Engineer's Beneficial Association, $56.81
per person.
The total contribution, in that respect, by a relatively small
union, MEBA, amounted to $539,771. That came out of the wages
of your members, did it not?
CaFhoon ; ~ 1 would think so.
McCloskey then went on to ask him if he would object to a bill
which limited subsidy to what actually went to the seamen themselves, and
barred its use for political contributions, union-operated schools, etc.
Mr. Calhoon replied gravely that he would "have to think about that."
The unions' ability to raise large sums of money is not really
too difficult to figure out.

Of all labor organizations, maritime unions

have perhaps the greatest degree of power over their members and, what is
more to the point, they receive large amounts of their members' money directly from the employers, in the form of vacation and various other
funds.

It is not always easy for union members to get back all of that

money in tac t

.

Union Fundraising
In 1969, Congress-watchers

noticed that some of the most ardent

supporters of the Democratic party were Japanese and Filipino seamen who
were working on Vietnam-bound U.S. merchant vessels under a temporary wartime dispensation.

Most of these foreign seamen were not even union mem-

bers, but they were contributing up to $500 at a crack, to the SIU political fund.

This amounted to about a third of their wages each trip.

l U.S. Congress, House, Maritime Authorization 1979, HR 10729,
95th Congress, 2d Session, Serial No. 95-37, pp. 359-360
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The foreign seamen were signed.on as replacements abroad, for
American seamen who got sick or simply had to leave for some reason.

At

wartime wages of as much as $1000 per month for even menial positions,
the foreigners were jumping at the chance and gladly paid so-called
"service fees" to union agents who controlled hiring.

Although American

crewmembers typically contributed $5 - $25 per trip to the SIU's SPAD,
Japanese, Filipino and Scandenavian seamen were regularly kicking in up
to a third of their wages.
This attracted the interest of the Justice Department, which, in
1969, asked a Federal Grand Jury to indict the SIU and its President,
Paul Hall, for illegally extracting money under duress from foreign seamen, many of whom had never set foot on American soil, but whose money was
helping to influence American elections.
Federal investigators found substance to the charges.
stance, aboard the tanker St. Lawrence in 1968,

For in-

three American seamen

contributed $2, $10 and $17 respectively, while each of nine foreign seamen "donated" $500 each.

They found that a single payday aboard one ship

yielded as much as $7250 for the union's political fund, most of it from
foreign seamen.

In addition to collection from foreigners, the SIU was

accused of threatening American seamen who lacked job seniority, causing
these seamen "to fear that failure or refusal to make contributions to
SPAD would result in the loss of their employment." 2
The investigation resulted in a seventeen count conspiracy indictment, alleging that the union had contributed as much as $750,000
to campaigns for federal office in violation of the Corrupt Practices
Act.

SPAD's heavy political spending continued right on through 1969

(a non-election year) however, when it gave an additional $32,951 to
federal candidates, $112,578 to state and local candidates, and $211,529
2Wall Street Journal, 3 Jan. 1969, p. 1;

30 June 1970, p. 8
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for unidentified "other expenses", which included honoraria of up to

$3000 each for speeches by Congressmen.

"It was part of the conspiracy,"

alleged the indictment, "that SPAD would exist only on paper and be nothing more than a device to conceal unlawful political contributions by
the Seafarers International Union." 3
The case was open and shut, and in 1970 Attorney General John
Mitchell had witnesses ready to testify that the union had forced them
to contribute to political funds against their wishes.

A similar case

was being prepared against United Mine Workers boss Tony Boyle.

Suddenly,

however, the heat was off the Seafarers, although the case against Boyle
proceeded to conviction.

In the SIU case, federal prosecutors abruptly

lost interest and it was dismissed by a Federal District Court Judge on
the grounds that the Government had not prosecuted

in,~rompt

fashion.

The Justice Department did not appeal this decision, in effect dropping
the case with no reason given.

It was shortly after that that President

Nixon received the $100,000 SPAD donation for his re-election fund (see
page 43).

Later, Paul Hall, with $100,000 invested in Nixon, would be

the only holdout in the anti-Nixon "resign-or-be-impeached" resolution
passed in 1973 by the AFL-CIO. 4
The MEBA also has its source of captive contributors. According
to a 1971 article in the Wall Street Journal the MEBA "leans on pensioners
who can't easily elude political collectors; and, at times, leans on
deceased members' widows too."
The article quotes 73 year old James Green, a retired MEBA member, who gets a pension of $315 a month.
tough," he said.

Yet, along with 2000 other pensioners, he was giving

a minimum of $10 a month.
claimed.

"Things are getting kind of

"I didn't know it was for politics!" he ex-

"I thought it was just to help them ou t

3Wa l l Street Journal , 1 July 1970,
4Time Magazine,

3 Dec. 1973,

p. 5

pp. 23-24
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According to the Journal's article, union officials and collectors
rarely seem to tap themselves.

John Brady, secretary of MEBA's Brooklyn

district, listed no donations over $100 per year for union officials, not
even from district President Raymond McKay (salary $43,112 plus $20,671
for expenses) but he reported several donations well over $100 from widows whose dead husbands had failed to pay their political "voluntaries".
For example, he collected $705 from Lorraine Clark, issuing a receipt
for "voluntary contributions".

The same year he required Jeanne Crehan

of Kenmore, New York, to sign over a $325 check to the union before she
could receive survivor's benefits.

The official reason:

"Mr. Crehan

had not paid any voluntaries, and this check was to catch up."
Lawrence Henkel of Baltimore believed his annual $120 was for
"our doctors".
welfare fund.

Lionel Brown of Brooklyn thought he was giving to some
George Wansor of New York donated because "the union came

to me with a song and dance about hiring a lawyer to take care of our
pensions."

John Palmer, of the Bronx, believed it helped to buy eye-

glasses and clinic care for other men.

"It has nothing to do with poli-

tics, I'm sure." he said indignantly.
Retired MEBA members came up with over $250,000 in 1971;
than half of the political money MEBA spent that year.

more

Few of the union's

active members gave as much individually as did the pensioners, including
MEBA President Jesse Calhoon who, with a $75,000 salary the previous year,
gave not one dime more than Jimmy Green (retirement salary $3,780).

Calhoon

seemed confident that the government had no leverage to break up the collection scheme.

Asked what the members thought of it, a Calhoon spokesman

said; "I'm not going to talk about that stuff.,,5
The National Maritime Union also has its collection methods.

When

members report to the union hall to pick up their vacation pay, instead of
some of the money they receive little stickers, which look vaguely like

5Wall Street Journal , 15 Nov. 1971 , p. 1

62

Gold Bond stamps, labeled "NMU Fighting Fund - $5.00".

Anyone who ob-

jects is quickly given to understand that his approval is irrelevant,
only his cooperation is required.

In the SIU also, plenty of pressure

is put on American union members, not just on foreign seamen:
"The union really muscles you," asserts James Condon of Northville
Michigan, a 27 year old Seafarer. "Last sunnner I went down to the
union hall near Detroit and asked the dispatcher how much dues I
owed. He totalled up the bill and it got into hundreds and hundreds of dollars - something like over a thousand. I couldn't pay
so he takes me into the back room."
In-We can make a little deal,' he says. 'Don't tell anybody, but the
only way I can ship you out is for you to contribute to our political fund.' So I paid $160 for the job, but it turned out to be
temporary."
Albert Dykes, 32, of Chesapeake, Va. worked at a non-union place
for a time, also letting his dues to the Seafarers fall in arrears.
"They said lowed them $502," he relates. "I just gave them the
money and they put it where they wanted to themselves." Mr. Dykes
says he got a dues receipt for $322 and union records reflect a
$180 donation by him to SPAD.
From Robert Wright, three union collectors in San Francisco once
demanded $1,400 in dues and assessments. $400 wound up in the
Seafarer's political kitty. From Angelo Pedrosa, the union wanted
$650, including $125 for politics. Unless he paid, "you ain't got
no chance in this union no more," one collector reportedly said.
To Fred Boone, the union presented a dues receipt for $600. Mr.
Boone objected, whereupon an irritated agent allegedly raised the
figure to $1,039.18, including $120 for SPAD. 6
The same year as the above article was written Paul Hall, SIU
President, earned $53,836 plus expense money totalling $20,422, but his
name does not appear among the donors to the union's political fund.
Union leaders are not unaware of the backlash this sort of thing
creates among their membership, and they are getting more careful about
violations of Title 18 as well.

On the back page of every issue of The

Master, Mate & Pilot, official organ of the MMP, there is a fund appeal.

6Wall Street Journal,

17 Dec. 1974,

p. 1
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The text of the December 1978 appeal is entitled: "THERE GOES YOUR JOB"
and reads, in part;

"If we don't convince the people in Washington to

speak up for the American seaman . • • there goes your job!
your own future.

Protect your job.

Invest in

Make your voluntary PCF contribution

today."
The PCF is the MMP's Political Contribution Fund, and a handy
contribution coupon appears on the same page.

After spaces for name,

address and amount of contribution, the coupon bears this message:
Voluntarily contributed for political purposes to MM&P Political
Contribution Fund. No physical force, job discrimination, financial reprisals, or threat thereof has been used in any way to secure this contribution. The contributor has been advised of his
right to refuse to so contribute without any reprisal, and this
contribution is entirely voluntary.7
The MM&P is obviously not taking any chances!
Not all union lobbying is done through the union political funds.
Various organizations have been set up as separate lobbying organizations,
many of them representing the joint interests of both unions and shipping
companies.

A partial list of such organizations is given at the beginning

of Chapter III.

Among them is the Transportation Institute, formerly the

Andrew Furusuth Maritime Research Foundation (Furusuth was a noted maritime
labor leader in the early days of the union movement).

Although ostensibly

a "research organization" which maintains a large library,

the Transpor-

tation Institute testifies frequently before the House Merchant Marine Committee and lobbys on most of the same issues as the official union
management lobbyists.

and

It also makes substantial contributions to poli-

ticians who favor the maritime industry's point of view.

The Joint Mari-

time Congress is a similar organization, which serves a different group
of unions and companies.

7The Master Mate & Pilot , December 1978,

back cover.
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The role of these organizations in lobbying has been called into
question because their support, and the funds they contribute, derive in
large part from subsidized companies, and therefore from the taxpayer.
This subject was explored during the 1979 Maritime Authorization Hearings:
Rep. McCloskey: Mr. Blackwell, I am disturbed about the prOV1S10n
of Title 18 of our Criminal Code that prevents lobbying with appropriated moneys. In the recent cargo preference fight, I note that
in the contributions to the campaign to promote cargo preference
we have $50,000 from the Transportation Institute and $100,000
from the Joint Maritime Congress. These moneys come, essentially,
83% , out of the Treasury, which subsidizes these costs as an
additional operating subsidy for U.S. carriers, does it not?
Mr. Blackwell: No, it doesn't. Let's not give a negative or
pregnant figure here. I don't think the figure is 83%.
Rep McCloskey:

I thought that was your percent.

Mr. Blackwell: You have to remember there are contributions
to those funds from non-subsidized operators . . . (some paragraphs
eliminated for brevity here).
Rep. McCloskey: But if the unions then negotiate as part of the
wage package that the company support something like the Transportation Institute, and the Transportation Institute's funds are
then used to promote lobbying activity, in effect, that Federal
money is going directly into that lobbying activity, is it not?
Mr. Blackwell: If those funds can be traced that way. I'm not
sure, Congressman McCloskey, what other resources the T.I. and
this other group you mentioned (the JMC) have. I'm not sure their
exclusive source of funds is this vehicle . . . 8
Mr. Blackwell may not have been sure, but figures from the Department of Maritime Manpower of his own organization show that union contracts
stipulate a certain amount per man per day to be contributed to the Transportation Institute or the Joint Maritime Congress, depending on the
union involved.

These amounts have increased substantially over the

past several years.

8U.S. Congress, House, Maritime Authorization Hearings - 1979 ,
HR 10729, 95th Congress, 2d Session, Serial No. 95-37, p. 19
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Some examples, drawn from recent union contracts:
Union

$ per man per day

Associated Marine
Officers (AMO)
MEBA, Pacific District

$1
94¢

Given to
T.1.
J.M.C.

SIU, Pacific District

$1

T.1.

MEBA, Atlantic & Gulf (If!)

94¢

J .M. C.

MEBA, Atlantic & Gulf (#2)

$1

T.1.

SIU, Atlantic & Gulf

$1

T.1.

Un-subsidized companies pay these amounts as well, of course,
but we are mainly concerned here with the contribution of subsidized
funds.

If we assume an average figure of $1 for each subsidized

billet and multiply that times the number of these billets in 1978
(7,241) we get a potential daily contribution of $7,241, which comes
to $2,642,965 per year of federal subsidy which is going directly into
lobbying to create yet more subsidy - a sort of subsidized perpetual
motion machine.
Added to this, is the possibility, currently being investigated
by the House Merchant Marine Committee according to Majority General
Counsel Gerald Seifert, that portions of company contributions to "training" are actually ending up in political slush-funds as welL
Clearly, Title 18 of the U.S. Code has been honored more in the
breach than the observance in union political fundraising.
that these practices may continue for some time yet.

It seems likely

CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have seen that maritime unions do, indeed, wield a good deal
of influence over the formation of U.S. shipping policy;
out of proportion with their size.

an influence

We have seen, also, that this poli-

tical influence results from intensive lobbying, backed up by generous
cash contributions to Congressmen, and that the per-capita level of these
contributions is the highest in the nation (compared with other major
unions).

And, finally, we have seen that maritime unions have corne to

see political influence as their only means of survival, and that they
use harsh and sometimes illegal means to obtain the money necessary to
sustain that political influence.
To acknowledge the foregoing, however, is not so much to indict
the maritime unions and their shipowning partners, as to indict the system
of government which has created this situation.

It is often said that

the U.S. has "no" maritime policy, and most people agree that what policy
we do have is inconsistant, haphazard, and the product of ad-hoc decisions
made in response to inter-agency conflicts and special-interest legislation.

So far, this problem has been widely acknowledged, but not cor-

rected.

President Carter is the latest in a line of Presidents to announce

that he intends to create a unified maritime policy which addresses itself
to the needs of the nation.
to be seen.

Whether he will succeed in doing so remains

Progress so far is unimpressive; yet there has been progress.

Until we have a maritime policy, we cannot expect the present
situation to change much.

When union leaders lobby for protective legis-

lation and hand out lavish contributions, they are only doing what they,
and their members, think is the logical response to a practical problem.
And union officials are nothing if not practical.
The solution lies in changing the way in which policy is made so
that this type of activity is unrewarding and, hopefully, unnecessary.
Union leaders should not have to bribe people to get legislation passed
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which will protect our merchant marine.
the public interest.

A strong merchant marine is in

And if union proposals go beyond the public interest,

or against it, then it should not be profitable to legislators to advance
them by unethical means.

Obviously, the foregoing is a truism.

But the fact that the

existing situation is not inevitable, and can be corrected, is just beginning to be realized.

The precedent for public financing of elections

has been set, and, eventually, it will be extended to Congressional elections, which should eliminate much of the incentive for under-the-counter
handouts.

At the same time, ever-increasing disclosure and "sunlight"

laws, and the proliferation of "citizens' lobbys" are making it harder
to take payola and get away with it.

Finally, there are active proposals

for a centralized merchant marine planning authority, where policy can
be made in a rational manner, with input from all branches of government,
but with centralized decision-making powers which are insulated from
pressure-group politics.
This is not to suggest that pressure-group politics will soon be
a thing of the past.

In the maritime industries, it can only be elimina-

ted by a merchant marine policy which makes the goals of special interest
groups identical with national goals.
bably not a complete impossibility.

That is a utopian view, but proAll major maritime powers have trouble

balancing the conflicting needs of their maritime interests with the aims
of public policy, yet many have achieved a better balance than the U.S.
It remains for us to define a comprehensive merchant marine policy
which finds accord and acceptance from the major elements of the public
and private sectors.

It is a difficult task, but not an impossible one.

And the indications are that it has already begun.
THE END
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